The Medieval and Early Modern Iberian World

FORMERLY MEDIEVAL IBERIAN PENINSULA

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This article presents a different facet to the expulsions of Jews and Muslims from Spain. That facet being how the wealthy took whatever steps were necessary to leave with their wealth intact. Most of the wealthy Moriscos left Spain years before the expulsions were proclaimed for they had been expecting them for over a century.

As for Salé, the author deals with that city beginning on page 324. She reveals the Hornacheros as being very clever or very devious, depending on your point of view. She documents their claim to be more Christian than Muslim but misses that this is exactly why they were not welcome in Salé by the Andalusian community and forced to take refuge in the crumbling wreck of the kasbah across the river in Rabat.

Unfortunately she does not discuss the development of Salé as a quasi-independent city-state with its founding under al-Mansur in 1595 but, instead, leaps to the wrong conclusion that the independent city-state started "after the 1620s" - a statement which is found with increasing frequency in scholarly papers. This could be an indication of the lack of research actually being done by scholars of late or their reliance on recent publications as being infallible in their assertions. [BAS]

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The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain

A Mediterranean Diaspora

Edited by

Mercedes García-Arenal
Gerard Wiegers

Translated by

Consuelo López-Morillas
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
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Contents

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This book was planned as such. That is to say, its editors started by deciding on a series of important issues, and we then allocated each issue to a specialist who was carrying out first-hand work in that area. To make the book as coherent as possible and in order to prevent overlapping, repetition or contradiction, we asked all authors to write extensive summaries of their respective chapters and these summaries were distributed among all the participants ahead of a conference with the same title as this book which took place in the Biblioteca Nacional de España in September 2009, with the financial support of the Sociedad Estatal para las Conmemoraciones Culturales and the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank both institutions, as well as those who attended the conference and took part in the debates and discussions, many of which modified and clearly enriched the final texts presented in this volume.

CHAPTER 12

The Moriscos in Morocco

From Granadan Emigration to the Hornacheros *of Salé*

Mercedes García-Arenal

In Morocco, the Moriscos expelled from Spain between 1610 and 1614 were known, like the compatriots who had preceded them, by the name of "Andalusians" (Arabic *andalusī*, pl. *andalusiyyūn*, i.e. from al-Andalus) and they formed part of an emigration process which had gone on for centuries. Morocco and the Naṣrid kingdom of Granada had been the main destinations of the displaced Muslim populations affected by the great Christian territorial conquests in the late Middle Ages, and the emigration which followed the Expulsion of 1610–14 was no more than the final chapter in a continuous and complex process.[1] The aim of this contribution is, then, to show the continuity of a chiefly Granadan process of emigration to Morocco and to highlight the existence of a set of structures created by these emigrants, which were to serve the Moriscos expelled at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Such continuities and structures constituted long-lasting patterns which I will describe in some detail: a leading role was played in them by prophetic predictions and the desire to return to and even re-conquer former Peninsular territories. It is particularly important to emphasise these emigrants' tendency to form autonomous communities that acted independently of local Moroccan authorities. Equally significant was the influence of the emigrants on certain political decisions made by Moroccan sultans, especially in the areas of political propaganda and diplomacy.

In a brief chapter like this, it is difficult to do justice to the richness and variety of a phenomenon which went on for more than a century. In the first part of it I will deal with the mainly Granadan emigration process and the various ways in which these Granadans settled in Morocco. The second part will cover the organised and clandestine voluntary departures of Castilian and Granadan Moriscos in the years before the official Expulsion decree. The third and final section will consider another group of Moriscos in Morocco: those who arrived after the official Expulsion. Most members of this final group

1 Muḥammad Razzūq, *Al-Andalusiyyūn wa hiğrātuhum ilā al-maghrib ḫilāla al-qarnayn 16 wa 17* (Casablanca: Ifrīqiya al-Šarq), 1989.

I am grateful to Gerard Wiegers and Daniel Hershenzon for references to sources I have used in writing this chapter, as also for their commentaries and suggestions.

settled within the areas and structures established by their predecessors in exile, but the information we have on this final stage in the emigration story reveals a complex and varied panorama which included Moriscos who were sometimes unwilling or unable to settle into their host country. Some of these Moriscos were fervent Catholics, many attempted to return to the Iberian Peninsula and others were not considered an integral part of the populations of Tetouan, Xauen or Salé for a considerable period of time. The Morisco inhabitants of Salé even negotiated with the Spanish authorities in an attempt to hand over control of the town's port in exchange for the right to return to their home towns in Spain. Taken as a whole, the emigration of Moriscos to Morocco reveals itself to have been a process of great complexity, extent and duration, and one which had clear consequences for the country which received them.

Sixteenth-century Granadan Emigration

From the second half of the fifteenth century onwards, the advancing Christian conquest of Granada produced an exodus of its inhabitants with effects that were to prove highly significant for several regions of North Africa. Such emigration reached one of its peaks after the capture of the city of Granada and the departure for Morocco of the Granadan elites of the Nasrid kingdom. The extent of legal emigration, i.e. the *paso allende* or passing-over to the other side which took place between 1485 and 1501, is hard to quantify. From what is stated by Hernando de Zafra in his letters to the Catholic Monarchs, we learn that some 8000 people left Granada and the Alpujarras region between January 1492, when the *Capitulaciones* officially handing over the city of Granada were signed, and October 1493, when the ruling sultan Boabdil left the city.[2] But other departures had already been organised, and had been taking place ever since Muḥammad al-Zagal left in the autumn of 1490. The German traveller Hieronymus Münzer, then resident in Granada, estimated that 40,000 people left the city, and this may even have been an under-statement. The possibility of returning to Granada after three years was contemplated in the signed *Capitulaciones*, and a number of important individuals did indeed go back. This included men like "Abrahen Abenazeyte," Zagal's former personal secretary, who under the name of "Hernán Valle" became the lifetime *regidor* [governor] of Guadix; don

2 José Enrique López de Coca, "Granada y el Magreb: la emigración andalusí (1485–1516)," in *Relaciones de la Península Ibérica con el Magreb (siglos xiii–xvi)* (Madrid: CSIC), 1988, 409–452.

Fernando Abdihaque de Fez, who had left with Boabdil; or Hernando Abengalib, who had belonged to the household of the last Naṣrid sultan. These and many other individuals returned and converted to Christianity.[3]

But there was also, both during and after the process of legal emigration, another ongoing process that was clandestine. From the start of the conquest the Castilians had authorised the legal departure of the defeated population after the purchase of a right to leave which could only be afforded by the wealthiest classes. For the rest, such charges and various kinds of indirect pressure by the conquerors made emigration difficult. Clandestine people-trafficking became common after 1500 (particularly after the revolt of the Albaicín neighbourhood of Granada and the conversion decrees of 1502) and was especially intense around the 1570–73 period as a consequence of the War of the Alpujarras.[4] There are numerous references to departures of Moriscos in Spanish records in the following decade, as well as frequent mention of the attempts made by civil and military authorities to prevent Moriscos from settling in coastal regions.[5]

Once they were in Morocco, the Granadans created from the late fifteenth century onwards a series of structures that were mainly urban and coastal, and made it possible for them to take up corsair and trading activities, as well as the trade in ransomed Christian hostages. A century later, the Moriscos deported by the decree of General Expulsion were also to engage in such activity. The Granadans protected the coast from Christian attacks and harassed borders and garrisons. Above all, they engaged in corsair activity. They did this for monetary gain, since *el corso* was a quasi-commercial trade universally practised throughout the Mediterranean, but they also did it as a means of waging holy war on the Christians of the Iberian Peninsula – the term *ǧihād* is often used to describe the work of corsairs in contemporary Arab sources. But one of the main reasons for this corsair activity, in the first half of the sixteenth century, was that it was needed as a way of organising the clandestine transportation of Mudejars and Moriscos to North Africa. The "Andalusian" populations involved in such actions, who were mainly of Granadan but also of Valencian origin, showed themselves capable of an intrepidity and bellicosity that was fuelled by the sense of uprootedness produced by wars and resentment towards inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula.

3 López de Coca, "Granada," 426, and *id.*, "Granada en el siglo XV: las postrimerías nazaríes a la luz de la probanza de los infantes don Fernando y don Juan de Granada," in *Andalucía entre oriente y occidente, (1236–1492): actas del V Coloquio Internacional de Historia Medieval de Andalucía* (Córdoba: Diputación), 1988, 599–642.

4 José Enrique López de Coca, "Esclavos, alfaqueques y mercaderes en la frontera del mar de Alborán (1490–1516)," *Hispania* 38–139 (1978), 275–300, esp. 277.

5 This is true not just of the records in Simancas, but of those in the Archivo Ducal de Medina Sidonia [ADM]. As an example, see ADM, Leg. 2395. Carta del Rey al Duque, El Escorial, 29 septiembre 1579… "Una carta del 21 del presente se rescibió en que nos avisais de los once moriscos que de un lugar del condado de Niebla se pasaron a Berbería y del ynconbiniente que es que vivan ni estén en puertos de mar, y lo que conbernía que así los moriscos libres como los esclavos, se saquen de los lugares marítimos por los yncombenientes que dello podrían resultar…"

This early process of emigration from Granada was certainly very different from that which occurred in the first years of the seventeenth century, for these emigrants were able to leave Spain in relatively comfortable circumstances. Most importantly, they spoke Arabic and possessed an Arabo-Islamic culture which made it easier for them to adapt to life in Morocco. They nevertheless displayed many of the features on which I intend to focus in the case of the expelled Moriscos: participation in corsair activity and the armies of the sultans, continuous contact with their coreligionaries in the Iberian Peninsula and the organisation of clandestine operations to help these colleagues leave the Peninsula. All of this was mixed with a desire to carve out an independent kingdom in Morocco, although this desire alternated and was combined with attempts to return to the Peninsula in one way or another. These ambitions resulted in various negotiations with Spanish authorities but also in several attempts to influence Moroccan authorities to provide the assistance needed to make a military invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. Morisco attempts to conquer the south of Spain using Morocco as the starting-point for an armed landing in the Peninsula never came to anything, but they did take place, and are recorded from the time of the War of the Alpujarras. Indeed, one of the aims of the Moriscos who took part in this war was to persuade Morocco to collaborate in a Muslim invasion and recovery of the territories of the former kingdom of Granada. Válor and other leaders of the Alpujarras "wrote many letters to many Moorish kings of Barbary begging for their favour and aid, offering them many goods and wealth from the kingdom of Granada and the whole of Spain, which they would receive without much trouble for there were over three hundred thousand Moors in Spain and with their help it would soon be placed in their hands."[6] The failure of the uprising of the Alpujarras and the lack of the

6 Juan de Arquellada, *Sumario de prohezas y casos de guerra*, f. 143, *apud* Manuel Barrios Aguilera, *La suerte de los vencidos. Estudios y reflexiones sobre la cuestión morisca* (Granada: Universidad), 2009, 111: "escribieron muchas cartas a muchos reyes moros de Beruería pidiéndoles su fabor y ayuda, ofreciéndoles muchos bienes y riqueças del Reyno de Granada y de toda España, lo qual abonarían con mucha facilidad porque ellos eran más de trescientos mil moros en España y con su ayuda sería presto puesta en su poder."

assistance expected from Barbary influenced the positions taken by the exiles in Morocco and at the same time breathed further life into the project of recovering the lost kingdom with Moroccan aid. All of these issues will be discussed in more detail in what follows below. But it is important to emphasize the difference in this sense between the Granadan emigration to Morocco and the Aragonese and Valencian exiles, a difference in strategy and aims that had taken place during their life in the Peninsula: while the uprising of the Granadans during the War of the Alpujarras was meant to reconquer the kingdom of Granada, Valencian and Aragonese uprisings and contacts with the Ottoman Turks were triying to raise a Morisco as their own king under the suzerainty of the Ottomans (a system similar to the one operating in North Africa) and under the Ottoman laws which allowed Jews and Christians to live as such in Islamic lands: "cada uno se salva en su ley."[7] I argue that this difference is an important ingredient in the specificity of Morisco emigration and settlement in Morocco.

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But let us consider for a moment the political and social situation of the country where the exiled Granadans settled. During the first half of the sixteenth century a small dynasty based in the city of Fez, that of the Wattasids, sought to uphold ancient Marinid splendour and defend itself from or negotiate with the Christian Iberians who captured garrison towns and ports on the coasts of Morocco. The conquest of Fez in the 1540s by Muley Muḥammad al-Šayḫ al-Sa'dī, a member of what was to become a new dynasty based in Sus, brought the whole territory of Morocco under his control, with borders not unlike those it has today. Muley Muḥammad al-Šayḫ was the first sultan of the Sa'di dynasty, a family which based its legitimate right to power on the fact (or claim) that it descended from the Prophet Muḥammad and was therefore entitled to use the term Xarife or Jerife (from the Arabic *šarīf*), and that it had made the *ǧihād* against Christians an important part of its political propaganda.[8] This dynasty nonetheless resorted at various times to alliances with the Spanish Crown, especially during the reign of Philip II, as a way of defending itself from Turkish interference. The Ottoman Empire had extended its frontiers as far as Algeria and one of its ambitions was to annex Morocco, or at

7 Rodrigo de Zayas, *Los moriscos y el racismo de estado. Creación, persecución y deportación (1499–1612)* (Córdoba: Almuzara), 2006, 431–432, 478, 485.

8 Mercedes García-Arenal "Mahdi, murabit, sharif: l'avénement de la dynastie Saadienne," *Studia Islamica* 21 (1990), 77–113.

least take control of ports on its Atlantic coast, an outcome that was feared by both the Sa'dis and Spain. Indeed, Muḥammad al-Šayḫ, who had refused to recognise the sovereignty of Istanbul, later died at the hands of his Turkish guard, who were acting under instructions from the Sublime Porte. The Moroccans also had to defend themselves from Spanish incursions and the Spanish occupation of a number of its major ports, and occasionally resorted to Ottoman aid for this purpose. Several Sa'di candidates for the Moroccan throne were later, during their civil wars, to alternate between seeking the support of Spain and that of the Ottoman Empire.

Portugal also had a history of intervention in Morocco, which had started with the taking of Ceuta in 1415 and continued with the capture or establishment of a series of ports on the Moroccan Atlantic coast, from Ceuta and Tangier to Santa Cruz do cabo de Gue, today Agadir, and Safi – the last two of which were captured between 1503 and 1508. These were the so-called *fronteiras* or towns *d'alem mar* which Portugal used to supply itself with wheat, and as a staging-point on the routes towards the West Indies. The existence of these strongholds in Christian hands (Spain had held Melilla since 1497) produced a feeling of harassment in Morocco, as well as making it impossible for the country to take part in maritime trade. The Moriscos settled, then, in a new border region, that of the coastal towns not occupied by the Portuguese or Spaniards, but situated very close to them. Given that it was impossible for them to play a role in sea trade and build their own fleet, the Moriscos set about fitting out small ships with which to harry other vessels at sea. The Granadans who populated and fortified a series of areas on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco became even more important from the late fifteenth century on.

In northern Morocco the exiles did not have much trouble forming autonomous communities which remained virtually independent for many years and were free to establish their own structures and authorities. The most representative case was that of Tetouan, a town that had been sacked and destroyed by the Portuguese in 1437. A Granadan military leader, al-Manẓarī, obtained a licence from the sultan of Fez to re-populate the town with his compatriots, and went about re-building and fortifying it.[9] It is particularly clear in the case of Tetouan that there was an uninterrupted flow of Granadan and Morisco

9 John Derek Latham, "The Reconstruction and Expansion of Tetuan: The Period of Andalusian Immigration," in *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A.R. Gibb* (Leiden: Brill), 1965, 387–408. Repr. in *From Muslim Spain to Barbary* (London: Variorum), 1986. Guillermo Gozalbes Busto, *Al-Mandari el granadino, fundador de Tetuán* (Granada: Caja Provincial de Ahorros), 1988.

emigrants from the moment of its founding until the time of the Expulsion. This is supported, for example, by the documents examined by Guillermo Gozalbes Busto referring to twenty descriptions of ransoms of captives carried out in Tetouan between 1523 and 1677. These records show the survival for more than a century of surnames of Hispanic origin, which mixed with those of the Jews, who were also Hispanic and took part alongside the Moriscos in the ransom trade, and with those of the so-called *renegados* or *elches*, Christians converted to Islam, whose lines of work and ways of life were similar to those of the Moriscos. The money generated by the trade in ransomed captives helped to create a local oligarchy of Granadan origin. Tetouan was described as "inhabited by many trading Jews and Andalusian Moors with the surnames Cárdenas, Cabreras, Mendozas, Lucas, Paes, Olivares and others who held on to their papers and title deeds in the hope that they could be used to re-possess their estates, which they said were unjustly occupied by the Christians."[10] The notion of the illegitimacy of the Christian conquest of the kingdom of Granada is one which we will meet again in this chapter, and was often used by the Granadan Moriscos who dreamed of recovering their former territory. Tetouan's involvement in the maritime expeditions which raided Spanish ships and coasts and took captives who were then ransomed was a constant feature for nearly two hundred years.

Tetouan received foreign (mainly English and Dutch) consuls and agents, and sought to become a kind of city-state, a "free state like Venice or the Netherlands" as the Granadans themselves put it.[11] There are various indications that when faced with the impossibility of recovering their old kingdom, the Granadan oligarchy decided that it wanted to carve out a new kingdom for itself in Morocco. Aḥmad Ḥasan, a Granadan who rose to power after the death of al-Manẓarī, established relations via Father Contreras with the Emperor Charles V to propose to him a conquest in his name of the kingdom of Fez, or even the surrender to Spain of the town of Tetouan itself, as a preliminary token ahead of the conquest of northern Morocco.[12] It was not the first time

10 Alejandro Correa da Franca, *Historia de Ceuta*, BNE, ms. 9741 fol 55. v *apud* Guillermo Gozalbes Busto, *Los moriscos en Marruecos* (Granada: G. Gozalbes), 1992, 105: "habitada de muchos judíos comerciantes y moros andaluces con los apellidos de Cárdenas, Cabreras, Mendozas, Lucas, Paes, Olivares y otros que conservan sus papeles y escrituras con la esperanza de que llegue el tiempo en que les sirvan para la posesión de sus haciendas, que dicen les ocupan injustamente los cristianos."

11 BNE, ms. 3634, f. 9, apud, Gozalbes Busto, *Los moriscos*, 228.

12 Gabriel de Aranda, *Vida del V.P. Fernando de Contreras* (Seville: T. López de Haro), 1692, 507–536; SIHM, Espagne, 95 and ff, 126 and 135 and ff.

that this had occurred nor was it to be the last: in the reign of the Catholic Monarchs, Sīdī ʿAlī ibn Rašīd, al-Manẓarī's father-in-law, made contacts with Hernando de Zafra and the Count of Tendilla – by then governors of the city of Granada. Various items of documentary evidence of these contacts have survived, mainly in the correspondence of Tendilla.[13] The contemporary Portuguese chronicler, Damião de Gois (1502–1574), specifically stated that Ibn Rašīd had offered to assist the Catholic King to conquer Fez on condition that he would be made king of this new realm – a kingdom which would enjoy a vassal status with regard to the Spanish king.[14] These sorts of dealings between Muslims and Christians were typical of a border region, as is well known from the final period of the kingdom of Granada. The border had simply moved southwards. The "Granadan" nature of the situation becomes even more evident when we see that Aḥmad Ḥasan's request for assistance from Spain related to the internal struggles between the descendants of al-Manẓarī and the Banū Rašīd. The affair was resolved by the capture of Tetouan by the Saʿdi Muley ʿAbd Allāh in 1567, an action that was carried out by an army corps of Andalusians headed by a well-known Granadan military leader, al-Duġālī.[15]

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The best-known and most widely documented case is that of al-Manẓarī, but the pattern was repeated in a number of smaller places. An endless number of minor news items have come down to us as scraps found in the Portuguese and Castilian chronicles of the period. One example is provided by the village of Tazuta, close to Melilla, where according to chronicler Luis del Mármol, "an Andalusian Moor, one of those who passed over from the kingdom of Granada, begged permission of the king of Fez and rebuilt it and populated it with Andalusian Moors he had taken with him and from there he was always

13 See for example, Emilio Meneses, ed., *Correspondencia del Conde de Tendilla* (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia), 1974, II: 36.

14 Damião de Gois, *Crónica do felicissimo Rei Dom Manuel* [Lisboa, 1566–67] (Coimbra: Universidade), 1926, I: 39. Gozalbes Busto, *Los moriscos*, 219. Marcel Bataillon, "Le rêve de la conquête de Fès et le sentiment impérial portugais au XVI siècle," in *Mélanges d'études luso-marocaines dédiés à la mémoire de David Lopes et Pierre de Cenival* (Lisboa-París: Institut Français au Portugal), 1945, 257–284 and esp. 259 and ff.

15 Mercedes García-Arenal, "Vidas ejemplares: Sa'id ibn Faray al-Dugali (m. 987/1579) un granadino en Marruecos," in *Relaciones de la Península Ibérica con el Magreb (siglos XIII–XV)* (Madrid: CSIC), 1988, 453–486.

waging war on the Christians of Melilla and Cazaza."[16] Another example is that of the small port of Azgán, repopulated and fortified by "Andalusians, a warlike people, and they have more than six thousand fighting men and a number of horses and crossbowmen and gunmen on foot."[17] Similar news survives of Targa,[18] a coastal town close to Xauen, or of Camis Metgara (or al-Ḫamīs)[19] "five leagues from Fez," and also Sofroy in Cuzt and many other places.[20] Recent archaeological digs on the northern Moroccan coast and around a series of coastal towers and fortifications between Xauen, Wadi Law and Abu Aḥmad, show that these towers were built by Granadans in imitation of the system of coastal vigilance of the kingdom of Granada.[21] The political region of Tetouan and its mountainous backdrop in Xauen extended eastwards along the hills of Jebala, not far from the coast, and between the Portuguese garrison towns of Ceuta and Tangier, where Moriscos were also to settle.

There was also Andalusian settlements on the Atlantic coast, and Portuguese chronicles record a number of minor episodes in the areas around Arzila y Larache. These consisted of attacks by Granadans and Andalusians who had taken it upon themselves to wage small-scale campaigns of attrition and continuous harassment.[22]

16 Luis del Mármol, *Primera parte de la descripción general de Affrica, con todos los sucessos de guerras que a auido entre los infieles y el pueblo christiano* (Granada: Rene Rabut), 1573, II: 156 r.: "un moro Andaluz de los que se passaron del reyno de Granada la pidió al rey de Fez y la reedificó y pobló de moros andaluzes que avia llevado consigo y desde allí hazía siempre guerra a los cristianos de Melilla y de Caçaça"; J. Lèon l'Africain, *Description de l'Afrique* (Paris: Maisonneuve), 1956, I: 291.

17 Mármol, *Primera parte*, II: 167 r.: "Andaluzes, gente bellicosa, y tienen más de seys mil hombres de pelea y algunos cavallos y vallesteros y escopeteros de a pie."

18 C. Gonzalbes Gravioto, "La costa de Ceuta a Tetuán en los siglos XV Y XVI (Notas de toponimia portuguesa)," *Cuadernos de la Biblioteca Española de Tetuán* 19–20 (1979), 83. See also André Bazzana, Patrice Cressier, et al., "Première prospection d'archéologie médiévale et islamique dans le Nord du Maroc," *Bulletin d'Archéologie Marocaine* 15 (1983–84), 367–450, esp. 381.

19 Camis Metgara (al- Ḫamīs), Lèon l'Africain, *Description*, I: 178. Mármol, *Primera parte*, II, 83 v-84.

20 As Mármol names the little coastal localities difficult to identify nowadays. Mármol, *Primera parte*, II: 162 r.

21 Bazzana et al., "Première."

22 In Mazagan and the surrounding area there had been a recorded Morisco or Andalusi presence since 1560 (*apud* Antonio Dias Farinha, *Historia de Mazagão durante o periodo filipino* (Lisboa: Lisboa: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos), 1970, 76. See also Bernardo Rodrigues, *Anais d'Arzila. Crónica inédita do século xvi* (Lisboa: Academia das Sciências), 1915, 193.

The phenomenon of repopulation and fortification was not restricted to Morocco, as is shown by the contemporary sources and records mentioning several places on the Algerian coast from Oran and Mars al-Kabīr to Bougie, and which include Tenes, Mostaghanem, Miliana and Algiers itself. The case of Cherchell (Sargel in Spanish records) is the most representative and I believe it will be illustrative to quote Mármol's text on it, because of the way he turns it into an archetype.[23] According to Mármol, Sargel

> was unpopulated for more than three hundred years until the Catholic king don Hernando won the city of Granada at the beginning of the year of Our Lord 1492, when many of the Moors who lived in that kingdom passed over to Barbary and some of them started to populate it, repairing only the castle and those houses they found most comfortable to live in and day by day the whole of that plain has been further populated by Mudejars, Andalusians and *Tagarinos* (Mudejars from Aragón), ingenious and brave men who have a lot of very good farming land and great extensions of olive groves and vineyards within the old walls of the town and they have planted many mulberry trees for the breeding of silkworms, which is their main farming activity because the land is very good for it and more than five thousand houses have been built where there are usually more than a thousand gunmen and archers among the inhabitants.

23 Mármol, *Primera parte*, II: 211 r.: "Estuvo mas de trescientos años despoblada hasta que aviendo ganado el Catholico rey don Hernando la ciudad de Granada en el principio del año del Señor mil y quatro cientos y noventa y dos, se passaron muchos de los Moros que vivian en aquel Reyno a Berbería y la començaron algunos dellos a poblar reparando solamente el castillo y aquella parte de casas que hallaron mas cómodas para su vivienda y de dia en dia se ha ydo poblando todo aquel llano de Mudéjares, Andaluzes y Tagarinos, hombres ingeniosos y valientes que tienen muchas y muy buenas tierras de labrar y grandes pagos de olivares y viñas dentro de los muros antiguos y an puesto cantidad de moreras para la cría de la seda que es su principal granjería por que la tierra es muy buena para ella y se an hecho mas de cinco mil casas donde ay de ordinario mas de mil escopeteros y vallesteros de los vecinos." Diego de Haëdo uses similar words on this subject. Referring to the corsair ships which were usually fitted out in Sargel, he writes "los maestros dellos son todos moriscos de Granada, Valencia y Aragón, de los cuales está todo aquel lugar lleno y poblado. Estos son, por la mayor parte los arreases dellos, porque como son todos nacidos en España, son muy platicos en sus puertos, marinas y costas...y entrando en la tierra en habito cristianesco y hablando bien español..." Haëdo believed that much damage was being done by them. Diego de Haëdo, *Topografía e historia general de Argel* (Valladolid), 1602, 91–92. A little further on he adds (95), "de Sargel, miel, pasa, higo" [from Sargel, honey, raisin, fig].

All of the sources containing information on the places where the Andalusians settled confirm their warlike nature and their defence of the coast, as well as a clear agricultural vocation, which mainly manifested itself in a dedication to horticulture and the cultivation of fruit crops, as well as olive trees from which they obtained oil, together with sugar cane, hemp, flax and, above all, silk.[24] All of these activities loyally reflected the traditions of Granada. Reports also make constant reference to the re-population of unpopulated and semi-ruinous areas and to the Moriscos' need to defend themselves against local tribes. As I have said, in the first half of the sixteenth century the Moroccan coastline was practically blocked off by Castilian and Portuguese occupation and assailed by the continuous expeditions and raids made by the Christians from their garrison towns or the Peninsula itself. This factor combined with a series of plagues (the most famous and devastating of which took place in about 1521)[25] and a sequence of droughts to produce tremendous depopulation throughout northern Morocco, with the subsequent abandonment of a wide area of agricultural land and the intensification of predatory nomadism. The Andalusian contribution was therefore, in all these senses (re-population, defence of the coast, recovery of agricultural areas) the only positive factor to set against an extremely negative set of circumstances. Morocco was then a sparsely populated country, and the Andalusian additions to population must have made a significant impact on the demographics of the region.

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However, the Granadans or "Andalusians" in general not only devoted themselves to what Braudel called the "small war" of corsair actions, but also to the kind of military activity carried out by the sultans' armies. The Arabic chronicles contain mention of army corps made up of Andalusian soldiers since the Marinid period.[26] These were mainly crossbowmen, who had become harquebusiers and artillerymen by the time of the Wattasids.[27] Muḥammad al-Šayḫ,

24 Mármol, *Primera parte*, II: 162 r.

25 Bernard Rosenberger and Hamid Triki, "Famines et épidémies au Maroc aux XVIème et XVIIème siècles," *Hespéris- Tamuda* 14 (1973), 109–175.

26 Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī, *Masālik al-Abṣār fī mamālik al-Amṣār* (Paris: P. Geuthner), 1927, 147, 205, 214. Luis Seco de Lucena, *Marruecos a comienzos del siglo XV según Ahmad al-Qalqasandi* (Tetuán: Editora Marroquí), 1951, 103.

27 The Wattasids of Fez had, according to Diego de Torres, "Modéjares tiradores [Mudejar shooters]" in their army; *Relación del origen y sucesso de los Xarifes y del estado de los reinos de Marruecos, Fez y Tarudante* (Madrid: Siglo XXI), 1980, 141 and 144. See also SIHM Espagne, I, 79.

the first Saʿdi sultan, undertook a series of attempts to improve and modernise the army which included the recruitment of infantrymen who knew how to handle firearms. Most of these infantrymen were Andalusians.[28] But it was al-Šayḫ's son ʿAbd Allāh who first resorted to the systematic recruitment of Andalusian emigrants, used by him to form a powerful *ǧayš al-nār* (i.e. artillery corps) to which I will refer below.

It was not only the artillery and harquebus units which were taken over by the Andalusians. Siege techniques had been an Andalusian speciality since the thirteenth century,[29] as was the manufacture of military devices. Biographical dictionaries include examples like that of Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥāǧǧ al-Išbīlī, a Mudejar from the city of Seville who settled in Fez and was an expert in engineering (*ḥiyāl al-hindasa*) who specialised in war instruments and mechanisms for the transportation and lifting of heavy loads. He founded the *dār al-ṣināʿa* of Salé during the reign of Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr al-Marīnī in the thirteenth century.[30] For the siege of Tlemcen, the Marinid sultan received reinforcements of archers and crossbowmen from Granada who were "habituados a los trabajos del asedio [used to working in sieges]".[31]

In the times of Leon Africanus, and also in those of Luis del Mármol (the mid-sixteenth century), the manufacture of crossbows and swords was in the hands of "Granadan and Valencian Mudejars" who also monopolised the dockyard where gunpowder and artillery were made.[32] Until the last quarter of the

28 Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier. A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago: University), 1978, 56.

29 A. Khaneboubi, *Les premiers sultans mérinides, 1269–1331. Histoire politique et sociale* (Paris: L'Harmattan), 1987, 159. The Magrebis never succeeded in familiarising themselves with the tactic of siege warfare. Diego de Torres (op. cit. n. 18) 288 went on to say at the end of the sixteenth century that the Moors "es gente enemiga de verse cercada [are a people not fond of seeing themselves surrounded]".

30 Aḥmad ibn al-Qāḍī, *Ǧadwat al-iqtibās fī dikr man ḥalla min aʿlām madīnat Fās* 2 vols. (Rabat: Dār al-Manṣūr, 1973–1974), I, 288.

31 Khaneboubi, *Les premiers*, 161.

32 Leon Africanus, in his description of Fez, mentions when writing of the Qaysariyya that there were makers of crossbows who were "Moors from Spain" (Lèon l'Africain, *Description*, I: 201). Mármol says of the Qasariyya of Fez (II, 90r) "ay doze tiendas de Mudéjares Granadinos y Valencianos vallesteros [there are twelve crossbow shops run by Granadan and Valencian Mudejars]".

sixteenth century the Andalusian monopoly of artillery (both its manufacture and its use in the army corps) in Morocco seems to have been absolute.[33] This generalisation can probably be extended to cover other parts of the Maghreb, especially Algeria.[34]

It was the Sa'di sultan 'Abd Allāh, son of and successor to Muḥammad al-Šayḫ, who gave the order in 1563 to the Granadan leader al-Duġālī, *alcaide* of Tetouan, who had played an important role in a series of famous raids on the coast of Almería, to recruit soldiers in the Andalusian settlements and take them to Marrakech to form an army corps of artillerymen. Once they had gone to Marrakech, the sultan gave them lands on the western side of the fertile plain outside the city, where they sowed the fields, created market gardens and built channels and windmills, as a result of which "their nostalgia for the homeland was assuaged."[35] The area they created was given the name Riyāḍ al-zaytūn, which according to Mármol was called "Órġiva la Nueva" [New Órgiva] by its inhabitants, most of whom were originally from the Alpujarras.[36] Al-Duġālī himself, again according to Mármol, had been born in Órgiva[37] and was the son of Morisco parents.

Al-Duġālī formed an army corps of about 4000 Morisco harquebusiers who under his leadership carried out actions that had a very significant bearing on political events in Morocco. In particular, the Morisco troops of al-Duġālī took part in the battle against Dom Sebastian in 1578 and later, shortly after the battle of Ksar El Kebir, al-Duġālī and other Morisco leaders attempted a *coup d'état* against the recently named sultan, Aḥmad al-Manṣūr. The plot was discovered and al-Duġālī and the other Morisco leaders were decapitated. This attempt by a group of Granadan Moriscos to seize power in Morocco is highly interesting, and seems partly to have been made in defence of the son of 'Abd al-Malik, who had Turkish support, but was mainly designed to create a new Granadan kingdom, perhaps with the aim of gathering together the means to attempt reconquest of the territories of the old Muslim kingdom of Granada.

Aḥmad al-Manṣūr had the rebel Morisco leaders executed and sent many others on an expedition to Sudan, far removed from the Moroccan court, or to

33 Mármol, *Primera parte*, II: 92 r.

34 Mármol, *Primera parte*, II: 85v. Most of the news concerning the Andalusis which is recorded in the sources associates them with the army. One example of this is the report written by A. Sherley (SIHM, Angleterre, II, 543).

35 al-Fištālī, *Manāhil al-ṣafā fī ma'āthir mawālinā al-shurafā'* (Rabat: Matbū'at Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Šu'un al-Islāmiyya wa-l-Thaqāfa), 1973, 42.

36 Mármol, *Primera parte*, II: f.33 r.

37 Mármol, *Primera parte*, II: f.79 v.

the coastal regions, but the presence of a significant Granadan population had its influence on the sultan's political propaganda, which was riddled with messianic pretensions and calls for the reconquest of al-Andalus.[38]

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Aḥmad al-Manṣūr died in late 1603 and after his death, his sons embarked on an armed struggle to dispute succession to the throne. When al-Manṣūr died, one of his sons, Muley Zaydān, was proclaimed sultan in Fez and another, Abū Fāris, in Marrakech. Abū Fāris sent his own son, accompanied by the third brother Muley al-Šayḫ al-Ma'mūn, also a son of Aḥmad al-Manṣūr (known as "Muley Xeque" in Spanish records of the period), with an army to Fez, and the defeated Zaydān sought shelter and support in Turkish territory. Unity was not, however, achieved because "Muley Xeque" was then proclaimed sultan in Fez. The country was thus divided into two kingdoms, that of Fez and that of Marrakech, which resembled "city-states" with very little ability to control much more than the territory around their cities.

Initially, Spain was pleased by the occurrence of these Moroccan civil wars, reports of which reached the Council of State periodically after 1604.[39] However, the idea that Spain could benefit from the turbulent situation, which was encouraged by the fact that Muley Xeque made a request for assistance, soon turned into a feeling of fear and pressing danger. Muley Zaydān was a source of great concern to Spain because he was the Turkish-backed candidate and also because he sought to make an alliance with the Netherlands.[40] Indeed, the first Expulsion edict ordering the Moriscos to leave Spain, the one issued in Valencia in 1609, made specific mention of the imminent danger represented by Muley Zaydān as one of the reasons for adopting the measure at that time. This is because Muley Zaydān had inflicted a definitive defeat on Muley Xeque and his son Muley 'Abd Allāh in early 1608, conquering Fez; months later, an expedition led by the Marquis of Santa Cruz had been sent to capture Larache but had ended in failure.[41]

38 Mercedes García-Arenal, *Ahmad al-Mansur. The beginnings of Modern Morocco* (London: Oneworld), 2009.

39 Many of them were collected together and sent to the Duke of Medina Sidonia. ADM, Legs. 2402, 2406, 2407.

40 Gerard A. Wiegers, "De complexe relatie tussen religie en geweld. De Marokkaanse Sultan Zaydan en de *djihad*" *Leidschrift* 20–21 (2005), 122–139.

41 A detailed account of these events can be seen in Mercedes García-Arenal, Fernando Rodríguez Mediano and Rachid el Hour, *Cartas Marruecas. Documentos de Marruecos en archivos españoles (siglos XVI–XVII)* (Madrid: CSIC), 2002, esp. 78 and ff.

The port of Larache was one of the few still in the hands of the Moroccans and had been a source of constant concern to the Spaniards, who had made repeated attempts throughout the reign of Philip II to have it conceded to them without ruining the alliance with Morocco they considered necessary to block Turkish advances. Larache had by then become a shelter for Moroccan and Morisco pirates, and also for pirates from England and the Netherlands, with the subsequent danger this implied for the coasts of southern Spain and, above all, the route to the Indies.

The taking of Larache was seen as a priority for defence against the corsairs and as a means of detaining the possible Morisco revolt in the Peninsula that was so widely feared during these years.[42] Even more importantly, the danger which Muley Zaydān represented was increased by the fact that towards the end of that same year of 1608 an alliance treaty was being negotiated with the Dutch which was to be signed in 1610.[43] The connection between the decision to expel the Moriscos and both the general situation in Morocco and the dangers associated with the rise of Muley Zaydān can also be seen in the way in which records have been filed in the Estado section of the Simancas archive. The documents and their arrangement show the issues discussed in the years leading up to the Expulsion in Council of State meetings. Among the documents referring to Barbary we find reports on the pirates who helped Moriscos to leave, the negotiations towards alliances of one kind or another, and the need to take Larache.

The civil war lasted several years. Once Fez and northern Morocco were taken, Muley Zaydān recruited large numbers of expelled Moriscos for his army, just as his predecessors had done: some 8000 of them according to contemporary sources.[44] Muley Xeque had done exactly the same, using the Moriscos as cannon fodder.[45] When he was defeated, Muley Xeque sought

42 A *memorial* of 1607 recommending the king to capture Larache, says among other things, "Teniendo V. Mgd el puerto de Larache ataja todos los acometimientos y socorros de los moros, en Andaluzia Granada y aquellas partes, y las esperanças de leuantamiento y rebelion de los Moriscos, que tratan por los dichos agentes pero no con resolucion hasta procurar alguna mas union entre los principes Moros." AGS, Estado, Leg. 207.

43 Pascual Boronat y Barrachina, *Los moriscos españoles y su expulsión* (Valencia: Francisco Vives y Mora), 1901, vol II and ff. This book contains several documents which reflect the alarm created by the Moroccan alliance with the Dutch Republic and the possible repercussions if an alliance with the Moriscos is added to it.

44 SIHM, France, 1ere série, II, 495.

45 ADM, Leg. 2408. Letter from Alonso de Noronha to the Duke of Medina Sidonia, 1 April 2010, "Muley Xeque trahía en su almahala 8.000 moriscos de los que desembacaron en Orán, los quales determina echar delante al enemigo sy lo encontrase."

refuge in Spain, and he also sought the aid he needed to return to Morocco with an army, obtaining it in exchange for the concession of the port of Larache to Philip III. Larache was occupied by the Spaniards in 1610, the very same year of the decree expelling the Castilian Moriscos. These Moriscos therefore arrived in a country devastated by the effects of a long civil war. However, in the records I have just cited, in the years before 1607 and 1608 it can clearly be seen that the Moriscos were already organising their clandestine departures across the Pyrenees well before the Expulsion. The permanent state of alert within Old Christian society is also very clear from these records, as can be seen from an example I will now quote.

Clandestine Morisco Departures in the Years before the Expulsion

In order to show that, as I said at the beginning of this chapter, Morisco emigration to Morocco, especially from the Granada region, was a continuous stream in the years before the Expulsion decree, I would like to cite one specific and well-documented case which reveals the workings of the networks of Morisco solidarity which made clandestine emigration possible. This example shows, above all, the key role played by Granadans in Morisco leadership, as well as the mark left by the War of the Alpujarras and the prestige of its old military leaders among the Granadan Moriscos in Castile. I have chosen this example among many, although others are equally revealing, such as the case of a small boat carrying nineteen Granadan Moriscos living in Seville which was intercepted when trying to cross the Strait of Gibraltar in 1595 – several of the crew members were tried by the Lisbon Inquisition.[46]

I would, then, like to refer now to the affair which arose as a result of declarations made by one Jerónimo de Zúñiga, a 32-year-old sub-lieutenant from Lucena who made a statement in 1608 to the *alcalde* Gregorio López Madera. His declarations form part of a sizeable dossier which I will analyze in some detail, since it constitutes a highly significant "case study."[47] The reason the

46 Archivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, where the trial records of seven of them, accused of being Muslims, are kept. ANTT, Inquisição de Lisboa, nº. 4128, 9122, 2974, 4653, 12,095, 13,158, 6316. I am currently studying other similar trial records.

47 AGS, Estado, Leg. 2639. This document has been used and published by Hossein Bouzineb and Gerard A. Wiegers, "Tetuán y la expulsión de los moriscos," in *Tiṭwān ḫilāl al-qarnayn 16 wa 17* (Tetouan: Université 'Abd al-Malik al-Sa'dī), 1966, 73–108. I have used my own transcription of the document. See also Bernard Vincent "La conspiración morisca. ¿Proyecto o fábula?" *Estudis* 35 (2010), 115–129. I wish to thank Bernard Vincent for sending me a copy of his work before it was published.

statement was made is that while Zúñiga was a prisoner, certain persons had heard him make remarks which revealed that he possessed information that ought to be known to the authorities.

The declaration can be summarised as follows: Jerónimo de Zúñiga was travelling to Granada in August 1608 when he fell ill in Úbeda. In the inn where he was staying, he was attended by a "very lovely" Morisco woman with whom he "wanted to disport himself." Zúñiga consulted a procuress about the way to establish relations with the woman, whose name was Mencía de Baeza, and the procuress told him that to do this he would have to pass himself off as a Morisco. Zúñiga said that he knew nothing about Moriscos and that he would not know how to pass himself off as one, but the procuress persuaded him that it would be enough for him to pretend to be a member of the Venegas family "descended from the Moorish kings of Granada," i.e. the famous Granada Venegas family of noble Nasrid origin.[48] In the words of the archive records, the woman was convinced and "She [Mencía] let it be known among the Moriscos so rapidly that some came to visit him and expressed sorrow for his travails and illness" and wanted to take him to a Morisco surgeon, to which Zúñiga consented for "he had heard that the Moriscos had different ways of healing." Zúñiga's statement reveals points which should be highlighted: not only were there Moriscos who were indistinguishable from Old Christians, but an Old Christian could, if he so desired, pass himself off as a Morisco. The declaration also confirms what we learn from other contemporary sources about how Moriscos and Old Christians were able to mix and move together in ambits such as those of acquiring the services of a procuress or a Morisco doctor.

When it became known that Zúñiga was a member of the Venegas family, the local Moriscos started to treat him with great trust and friendliness, and the Moriscos of Quesada and Cazorla even began to write to him "entrusting him with details of all their affairs" and inviting him on several occasions to eat at their homes, sitting on the floor on their carpets "as our grandparents used to do." On these occasions he ate kid goat and other delicacies, all of them cooked without the addition of ham or any pig's meat. Moriscos from different towns in the area wrote at least three letters to him, summarised in an appendix attached to Zúñiga's statement (and headed "To Don Jerónimo de Granada

48 Mercedes García-Arenal, "El entorno de los Plomos: historiografía y linaje," *Al-Qanṭara* 24 (2003), 295–326. There is a longer version in M. Barrios, and M. García-Arenal, eds., *Los Plomos del Sacromonte: invención y tesoro* (Valencia: Universitat), 2006. Bernard Vincent, "L'histoire d'une déchéance: la famille des Fez Muley à Grenade au XVI siècle," *Les Cahiers du criar* 21, *Hommage à Alain Milhou* (2003), 69–79.

Venegas"), in which they urged him to go and cure himself among them. Particularly insistent on this point was Martín de Ávila, a seller of spices from Quesada, because "he said he was married to a woman who descended from the said Venegas and was also said to be a first cousin of Don Fernando de Válor, who rose against the Christians in the Alpujarras." The trust and respect shown by the Moriscos towards Zúñiga, who now went by the name of Don Jerónimo de Granada Venegas, was encouraged by his tales of life as a soldier in Ceuta, Flanders and France. The Moriscos were greatly interested in the information he gave them about these places, since they knew "that in France there was no Inquisition and they each lived in the law which he desired, but they resolved that for all law the best thing was to live among one's own," and that "for he who wants to be a Moor" the best thing was to go to Barbary. After gathering to eat, all their "pláticas" or talk was of Barbary and how to get there. Thus it was that they ended up confiding in Zúñiga that the Moriscos were organising themselves to leave and that some had already done so. One example was provided by the Moriscos of Baeza, many of whom had departed already. El Chapiz (a leading member of a Baeza lineage) and his father-in-law had set up a house in Toulouse, France "to prepare those who left and encourage those who stayed here" and for that reason El Chapiz had told them all that "France was the best land in the world," and with the aim of departing they were getting rid of their possessions as quickly as possible. Zúñiga met some "very wealthy" Moriscos like Gaspar de Benavides, Martín de Ávila and Bartolomé de Peralta, all of whom contributed to the operation with money from their estates, and others like Gonzalo de Mendoza, who also participated in the organisation.

The Moriscos were well-informed: they had a Morisco at court who warned them of developments and a person with access to the Council of State who told them about all the measures concerning the Moriscos that were taken there. This contact had been established by Bartolomé Palera, who spoke often to Jerónimo de Zúñiga, alias Granada Venegas, and told him "that nothing is done in the Royal Council which affects our people without me being told about it." Palera also told him that "in Toledo, Ocaña, Pastrana, Valladolid and Murcia there was a rich and important Morisco in every city who took care under orders from all to encourage and help those who had to leave and who collected certain sums of money which were sent to Toulouse to a safebox in Chapiz's power so that the Moriscos who arrived there without funds could be assisted and sent on to Marseille." Some of the Moriscos named were members of the most important Granadan families: for example, Lorenzo Hernández el Chapiz had taken part half a century earlier in the "Negocio General," the negotiated payment made by the Moriscos of Granada to stop the Inquisition from

bothering them.[49] Martín de Ávila claimed to be a relative of don Fernando de Válor and of the Venegas family, and it was for this reason that Zúñiga was respected and trusted. Again we meet members of the old Granadan elites who had managed and defended the interests of their community.[50]

The claims in the declaration made by Zúñiga/Granada Venegas are confirmed by other contemporary documents like those found among Inquisition records. We know, for instance, of departures of Moriscos from Pastrana in that same year of 1608.[51]

The Moriscos of Quesada, Úbeda and Cazorla spoke of leaving the country; they also spoke about expulsion, which they considered imminent, but did so without apparent concern, only remarking "let us take our silk and sell our goats and then little of this will matter." They sold their possessions for the prices they could achieve, as is confirmed by other sources.[52]

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49 Camilo Álvarez de Morales, "Lorenzo el Chapiz y el 'negocio general' de 1559," *Qurtuba* I (1996), 11–38.

50 See the articles by Enrique Soria Mesa, "De la conquista a la asimilación. La integración de la aristocracia nazarí en la oligarquía granadina. Siglos XV–XVII," *Areas* 14 (1992), 51–64; and "Don Alonso de Granada Venegas y la rebelión de los moriscos. Correspondencia y mercedes de Don Juan de Austria," *Chronica Nova*, 21 (1993–94), 547–560. Bernard Vincent, "Las elites moriscas granadinas," in *El Rio Morisco* (Valencia: Universitat), 2006, 187–199.

51 AHN, Inquisición, Leg. 196, nº 19. Such was the case of Mateo Pérez, a Morisco from Pastrana "de los del reino de Granada," who was captured in Vitoria on his way to France with three young daughters. This was the second time he had travelled to France, where he had previously left his father-in-law, his brothers-in-law and his wife with a baby, who were waiting for him in Saint Jean de Luz so that they could go on to Moorish lands. His father-in-law and brothers-in-law had on occasions tried to leave before: in Ágreda everything they had was taken from them and in Pamplona they were imprisoned, but then released and allowed to return to Pastrana. A second attempt was made, this time in a cart, accompanied by Mateo and his wife, who had left them in France and gone back to pick up the girls. They were captured. Mateo was sentenced to life imprisonment with ten years as a galley-slave, the girls to a convent, the eldest, who was 13 years old, to serve at the home of one of the functionaries of the Inquisition. Whilst in prison he spoke to other Moriscos in Arabic so that the Old Christians would not be able to understand him.

52 "Entre tanto los moriscos, sospechando lo que se trataba, reuníanse en conciliábulos; echaban suertes los más fanáticos de ridículas maneras de saber si ganarían o no sus intentos; se juntaban y discurrían de unos en otros lugares, siguiendo más a sus anchas en los usos muzlímocos, pues que los cristianos viejos ya no cuidaban de ellos sino para perseguirlos y atormentarlos… Por semejantes causas se hicieron algunos castigos en 1608 y entonces emigraron atemorizadas diversas familias de raza conversa, que prefirieron comer en paz el pan de la esclavitud en otros países. Los moriscos más acaudalados de Úbeda, Baeza y Villa de Quesada, se trasladaron con tiempo a Francia con sus hijos y mujeres, después de haber vendido todas sus haciendas a bajos precios" *Apud* Francisco

However, for the main argument of this chapter i.e. the importance of attempts to obtain Moroccan assistance towards reconquering the old kingdom of Granada, it is the second part of the dossier under analysis that is particularly interesting. Palera told Zúñiga that before leaving, El Chapiz had informed him of the agreements which the Moriscos had reached with king Muley Zaydān of Morocco (that is to say, Marrakech) and Muley Xeque of Fez, adding that the Moriscos would be able to raise an army of fifty thousand men as soon as they received aid from abroad. The Moroccan princes, said Palera, had not wanted to accept such deals because they were caught up in wars amongst themselves, but the Turks, with whom the Moriscos had also made contact, were more encouraging and had promised to smooth their passage through France: 1500 or 2000 of the wealthiest Moriscos had offered them their homes and possessions – the Turks, then, were seen as a key ally and superior to the Saʿdi monarchs.[53] Palera, at all events, did not want to talk much about these affairs, for he said that the fewer the people who were informed the better, since the cause of the failure of the uprising of the Alpujarras had been the great number of people who had known about it and allowed that information to reach the Christians. It will be seen that references to the War of the Alpujarras were recurrent. The same might be said of the theme of contacts with Muley Zaydān, since information has survived in several sources, to which I will refer below.

The declaration which I have just summarised, and which in itself deserves a far more detailed study, is part of a dossier in which other individuals alluded to also gave evidence, such as Mencía de Baeza and Gonzalo de Mendoza. It is a very extensive dossier which is accompanied by numerous statements made by captives who found themselves in Spain, having been ransomed after a prolonged period in Fez and Tetouan. From these statements it becomes clear that the authorities were not worried so much by the clandestine departures of Moriscos for Morocco as by the possibility that those who escaped did so in order to hatch and assist from there a revolt of the Moriscos remaining in the Peninsula, or to encourage a Moroccan invasion at the same time that the revolt was to take place. This possibility was something which the Spanish authorities took very seriously.

Janer, *Condición social de los moriscos de España* [1857], (Seville: Espuela de Plata), 2006, 100.

53 AGS, Estado, Leg. 2639, "Dijeron que ellos se querían lebantar y que para esto habían hecho trato los dos reyes de Marruecos y Fez Muley Çidan y Muley Jeque, y questos no habían querido açetar el trato por lo qual habían acudido al Turco y que el Turco lo había açetado y pedido myll hombres en rehenes y seguridad y questos habían de ser de los más ricos y poderosos y que assy se iba efectuando. Y para que tubiese mejor efecto el Turco abía pedido paso franco al francés y que les daba paso y que en Marsella tenían su cala…"

The most important document in the file is an *aviso* which was studied by the Council of State and had been sent in 1601 by the sub-lieutenant Bartolomé de Llanos y Alarcón from Tetouan, where he was being held prisoner.[54] In this *aviso* the Council was informed that Llanos "had known for certain that the Moriscos of Spain want to rise up, for which purpose they correspond with the King of Morocco and that there was now in Algiers a Morisco from Córdoba who had come from an embassy to the Turk, who had been told that the undertaking in Spain was a simple one on account of there being five hundred thousand Moors there, and although at first he was well received they later became aggrieved and sent him away because it seemed such a difficult enterprise. The said Morisco made many journeys and also involved in such talks were those of Aragón and Valencia, from which places there daily go to Algiers those who wish to do so." Pascual Boronat edited documents coinciding with these reports of Moriscos making contact from the Peninsula with Muley Zaydān, asking them "to send forces to aid and assist them, promising them that they would find here one hundred and fifty thousand men as Muslims as those of Barbary who would help them with their lives and possessions."[55]

Other Tetouan captives, in this case already ransomed, were also called upon to declare. One such man was Domingo de Villanueva, a former captive in Tetouan (1608), who spoke as follows: "when Muley Zidan defeated Muley Xeque who is now in Spain, this witness heard many of the leading Moors of Tetouan talk agitatedly and without paying heed to the captives, saying that now was the time to take Spain because their own kind were now in favour there and they would rise up and they said this to this witness every day... together with other Moriscos from Spain who had passed over to them and said now we will take Spain and when they were asked in what way this would occur they told him it would be with French and English ships and with their own ships and galleons they would form a fleet with the help of the Moriscos here in Spain who they said had been told when they had to rise up." "Because more Moriscos are going over to them and they give information about what is happening in Spain..." "they had to go into Spain with more than twelve or fourteen thousand horses..." "in Spain they had among the Moriscos heads who governed them and wrote to inform them of what was happening here." This witness believed such claims because he was astounded by how well-informed Moriscos in Tetouan were about what was happening at court, knowing if the king was going to El Escorial or staying in Madrid, and many other insignificant details which must have come from people at court with access to those close to government. Domingo de Villanueva continued his report by describing how Moriscos arrived in Tetouan every day with their families, children and possessions and that he had heard some of them say "that if in Spain they were allowed to live in their law, they would live more happily than in Barbary, but that the Inquisition bothered them so much that they left for that reason." This statement was corroborated by another captive, who during his time in Tetouan had belonged to a Morisco, and on one occasion had heard his master say "that he would see himself in Granada before he died, having defeated the Christians in battle and that they would defeat Spain and make it a part of Barbary." This statement expressed a widely-held belief that was reiterated by Moriscos in many different sources. One Aragonese *alfaquí* had said to his parishioners: "Be consoled friends, for this land was yours time ago, and without a doubt it will be yours again."[56]

54 AGS, Estado, Leg. 2636. Reproduced in the documentary appendix to Janer, *Condición*, 345 and ff.

55 Boronat y Barrachina, *Los moriscos*, II: 149: "que embiasse sus fuerças en su ayuda y socorro, asseguràndoles que hallarían acá ciento y cinquenta mill hombres tan moros como los de Berbería que les assistirían con sus vidas y haciendas."

Another witness who gave a statement was the captive Lucas Martínez Zapata, who was held in Tetouan for many years and said that in Fez and Tetouan he had seen many Moriscos from the kingdom of Granada who had passed over of their own volition, "and that it would now be about a year and a half (1607) since the witness saw enter into Morocco sixty households of Moriscos with their wives and children, who had come from the kingdom of Granada." They had departed, he declared, little by little, gathering and staying in Bordeaux, and from there left for Marseille, where they embarked for Morocco. Lucas had worked in the household of a Morisco master from Tetouan who told him to become a Moor, because the Moors were destined to conquer Spain and that he would see this with his own eyes. He was told that "soon all the people of Spain would have to embrace Islam."[57] This eschatological and prophetic belief that the Peninsula would be recovered for Islam and unified under one sole faith is constantly repeated in the sources.

Another former captive by the name of Miguel de Sese declared that from his contacts with Moriscos during his captivity in Tetouan he knew that they

56 The quotation is from the work by Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Xavier, and is used by Janer, *Condición*, 217: "Aconsolaos amigos, que esta tierra ha sido algún tiempo de vosotros, y ha de volver sin duda alguna."

57 For the messianic hopes of the Moriscos, both in Spain and Morocco, see Mercedes García-Arenal, "Un réconfort pour ceux qui sont dans l'attente: Prophétie et millénarisme dans la péninsule Ibérique et au Maghreb (XVI–XVII siècles)," *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, 220–224 (2003), 445–485.

were planning a revolt in association with the Moriscos of Spain. The first part of their plan was to take Ceuta and Tangier and to sail over to Spain from those ports. He had heard it stated that the Moriscos who left Spain were better Moors than those of Barbary. Finally, another captive claimed to have seen "the translation of an authentic letter from the Grand Turk to the King of France in which he asked the Moriscos who left here for Turkey to be well received, and this was seen in Saint Jean de Luz and Bayonne." The sea-captain Francisco Ortega from Gibraltar, who often crossed the Strait to carry correspondence to the Spanish territories in Africa stated that: "It is well-known that the Moriscos of Andalusia and other parts go over to Barbary with their households, wives and estates." "When this witness was a captive in Tetouan he heard that (many Moriscos) had passed over from Spain to Barbary, taking with them more than nine thousand ducats in money and pieces of gold, and the king Muley Xeque had taken their nine thousand ducats and sent them to be used for war and the wives of these Moriscos are in Tetouan clamouring to come to Spain."

Finally, this dossier also includes a report on the Moriscos of Hornachos and how they organised their departures from Spain. These Moriscos went to Granada (since they had the privilege of being able to move freely)[58] and from there sought the means to leave from Puerto de Santa María and other ports in Cádiz such as Tarifa and Gibraltar. One of the captives who testified declared that in Morocco he had met a Morisco from Hornachos who had passed over with all his family and other Moriscos from the kingdom of Granada, in a hired ship rowed by Old Christians, and to prevent it from being known that they were Moriscos they had to hide their wives beneath the ship's tarpaulins, because the women "did not know how to speak Ladino (the Spanish vernacular)." This witness declared that little by little all the Moriscos were passing over to Morocco. Diego de Cuenca, the priest of Hornachos, also warned that the Moriscos of his town had dealings with Morocco with a view to rising up and handing Spain over to those of Africa.[59]

Other confirming examples are provided by the Spanish agent of Genoese origin, Juanetín Mortara, in a letter to the Duke of Medina Sidonia in 1607,[60] in which he writes of three Moriscos in Fez who had fled from Ceuta to Barbary.

58 For the privileges granted to the Moriscos of Hornachos, see Houssein Bouzineb, *La Alcazaba del Buregreg, hornacheros, andaluces y medio siglo de designios españoles frustrados* (Rabat: Ministerio de Cultura), 2007, 32 and ff.

59 AGS, Estado, Leg. 218, "Adviértese que, para conseguir su mal intento, tienen trato y comunicación con los moros de África y embajadores del Rey de Marruecos para tratar con los demás moriscos de España de levantarse con ella y entregársela a los de África."

60 AGS, Estado, Leg. 2637, 165.

One of them had told Mortara that in Seville another ten households were prepared for flight with their families. It was through this information that the authorities came to know about a Morisco organisation which collected money from its communities and was in correspondence with dealers in silver and other officials to whom they sold silver, who melted it down and hired ships to take it to Ceuta. This organisation had a secret house in Antequera where the Moriscos gathered at night to read the Qur'ān.

The cited examples should suffice. We can conclude that Morisco emigration, which had flowed uninterruptedly throughout the sixteenth century, grew significantly in the years before the Expulsion.[61] This forces us to reconsider the figures which, ever since Lapeyre's classic study on the records produced by those who put the different Expulsion measures into practice, have been admitted as reliable estimates of the number of Moriscos who left Spain, and the size of the contingent which the Peninsula therefore lost.[62] They also provide us with a more diverse view of the Morisco minority, its elites and its capacity for self-organisation, planning and reaction. Lastly, they illustrate the leading role played by the Granadan Moriscos (who, it should be remembered, had been expelled from their own land in 1571) and their desire to conquer Andalusia with Moroccan aid. To put it another way, they sought to take advantage of their positions in Morocco or their military or courtly influence with the various sultans to try to recapture the old kingdom of Granada.

Let us return to this point to collect the information from several sources which confirm what we have seen in the dossier analyzed above: that the Moriscos tried in various ways to make Muley Zaydān act against Spain and that the Spanish authorities took these attempts very seriously. This aspect, that is to say the one which reflects the persistent and continuous efforts to get Moroccan aid in order to go over to Spain, is also of particular interest because it helps us to consider what might have been the effect or effects on Morocco of these belligerent, pressurising emigrants, who urged the drawing-up of alliances and treatises between Morocco and Spain's enemies, especially the Dutch Republic. This had already been occurring since 1596, when the joint Anglo-Dutch attack on the city of Cádiz took place. The Dutch, seeing the advantages for their country of an alliance with Morocco and wanting to gain the sultan's favour, presented him with a nobleman from Fez who had been held prisoner in Cádiz and whom they had seized during the capture of the

61 See also, with further examples and cases, Gerard A. Wiegers, "Managing Disaster: Networks of the Moriscos during the Process of the Expulsion from the Iberian Peninsula around 1609," *Journal of Medieval Religious Cultures* 36–42 (2010), 141–168.

62 Henri Lapeyre, *Géographie de l'Espagne morisque* (París, SEVPEN), 1959.

city. They also told the sultan that the Dutch had never intended to leave Cádiz, but to ask for Moroccan aid to occupy it permanently, and once conquered, to hand Cádiz over to Morocco as a way of opening a door and facilitating the recovery of the once-Islamic Peninsula. The raid on Cádiz made a tremendous impact and created new hopes of conquering Andalusia.[63] The possibility of an alliance between the Moriscos and the Dutch became a constant source of concern to the Council of State.

The Desire to Reconquer

A few years later, the Moriscos continued to think that a joint attack on Spain was feasible and they sought Dutch assistance to bring it off. Luis Cabrera de Córdoba records in his *Relación* that at the court of Madrid in April 1609 "It has been said that certain Moriscos had passed over to Africa as ambassadors for the others to the King Muley Zidan, offering him 60,000 armed men in Spain and much money, and that also present there were other ambassadors from the Islands [i.e. the Netherlands] who offered the ships that they might need, although it might be to use them to bridge the Strait of Gibraltar; all of which, although it have no effect, if true, gives cause for concern here."[64] In May of the same year, he added: "Muley Zidan of Morocco, who defeated the one from Fez, went with his cavalry to take a view of Tangier and without doing any damage turned around because he does not want to irritate us; before that he assured the merchants that they can trade so that their goods will not perish and he ordered Tetouan and Larache to be fortified, and laughed at the embassy of the Moriscos and sent them away saying that he did not want to go beyond his kingdom."[65]

63 SIHM, Pays-Bas, I, 27 and ff. See García-Arenal, *Ahmad al-Mansur,* 87 and ff.

64 Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relación de las cosas sucedidas en la Corte de España desde 1599 hasta 1614* [*1857*] (Valladolid: Consejería de Educación y Cultura), 1997, 367: "Se ha dicho que ciertos moriscos habían pasado a África con embajada de los demás al Rey Muley Cidán, ofreciéndole 60.000 hombres armados en España y mucho dinero, y que se hallaban allí otros embajadores de parte de las Islas que le ofrecían los navíos que quisiesen, aunque fuese para hacer una puente y pasar el Estrecho de Gibraltar; lo cual, aunque no haya de tener efecto, si es verdad, no puede dejar de dar cuidado acá."

65 Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relación,* 367: "Muley Cidán el de Marruecos, que venció al de Fez, pasó con su caballería a dar vista a Tánger y sin hacer daño dio la vuelta porque no quiere irritarnos; antes ha asegurado a los mercaderes que puedan contratar para que no perezca la mercancía, y hace fortificar a Tetuán y Alarache, el cual se ha reído de la embajada de los moriscos y los despidió diciendo que no trataba de salir de su reino."

As this quote shows, Muley Zaydān was trying in 1608 and 1609 to take control of Tetouan and other territories in northern Morocco. It was for this reason that he first negotiated with the Netherlands, requesting ships and arms which he planned to use to capture Tetouan. He also actively sought to attract Moriscos to his territories and to encourage the emigration and reception of those who arrived from Spain. With them he formed an infantry army corps of 3000 men and when he captured Fez, seeing that he could not trust the natives of that city, who were supporters of his brother and rival, "he ordered the Moriscos who lived in that city to come and serve him, saying that he would pay them; and warning that if they did not come he would kill them all."[66] He also attracted Moriscos to his court, where they worked as secretaries and translators. The example of al-Ḥağarī is sufficiently well-known to make it unnecessary to insist on this point (he is also mentioned in several of the contributions to this volume).[67] Muley Zaydān, we are told by Cabrera de Córdoba, had laughed at the Morisco embassy. However, like his father Muley Aḥmad al-Manṣūr, he had also made use of the theme of reconquering Andalusia for Islam in his political propaganda. This is very clearly explained by a contemporary Portuguese witness, a captive in Marrakech called Antonio de Saldanha. According to Saldanha, as soon as his father died Muley Zaydān gathered together his *alcaides* in Marrakech and told them that he had been chosen by his father to head the kingdom. He said that he had a large number of soldiers in his army and had decided to increase them further because it was by his hand that the prediction pointing to him as the saviour of the kingdoms of Granada, Murcia and Valencia would be fulfilled. He said he would repeat the feats of Ṭāriq the conqueror of al-Andalus, who had carried out the conquest against the advice of his followers and without possessing the treasures and armies which he, Muley Zaydān, possessed and had still managed to win even the heart of Spain. He told them to swear him in as their king and to leave everything else up to him.[68] This is a highly interesting piece of information which once again shows the legitimising and political propaganda power

66 *Memorial de Jorge de Henin. Descripción de los reinos de Marruecos* (*1603–1613*) (Rabat: Instituto de Estudios Africanos), 1997, 116: "mandó a los moriscos que vivían en aquella ciudad que le viniesen a servir, y que les daría paga; y si no viniesen, que los mataría a todos."

67 The contribution to this volume by Wiegers covers the presence of Moriscos at the Moroccan court.

68 *Crónica de Almançor, sultão de Marrocos* (*1578–1603*) (Lisbon: Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical), 1997, 367. Discussed by Gerard Wiegers in Wiegers, "De complexe," 135.

achieved by the motif of the reconquest of al-Andalus in a country with such a visible, significant presence of Granadan emigrants. It also shows how widespread were the more or less eschatological beliefs and predictions concerning this conquest. If for Muley Zaydān the invasion of Granada, Murcia and Valencia was an argument pointing to him as the best candidate to occupy the throne at a time of rivalry between several candidates, the Moriscos for their part were making serious efforts to act in some way.

Jorge de Henin, a Spanish agent at the court of Marrakech in the first decade of the seventeenth century, wrote a number of very interesting reports on Morisco attempts to gain the support of Muley Zaydān. He gives a detailed description of the return to Marrakech of the Moroccan ambassador at The Hague, close to the States General, and of the Jewish agent of the sultan, Samuel Pallache, who had accompanied him and who was described by Henin as a "servant of the States and of Muley Zidan [...] he who interweaves the correspondence between the States and Muley Zidan."[69] Samuel Pallache, "in the company of Moriscos banished from Spain proposed that with eight ships and two thousand gunmen whom they would seek out at their own expense" they could organise "raids on the coast of Málaga, where they were certain to apprise many captives and goods."[70] Muley Zaydān, the Moriscos proposed, had to persuade the Dutch to give him ships and in exchange they would hand over to him a quarter of all the booty they won. The sultan thought this a good idea, but Jorge de Henin, who had access to Zaydān's mother, convinced her to dissuade her son from undertaking such an enterprise. This, at least, was Henin's version of events – it has to be admitted that he had an obvious interest in wanting his part in Muley Zaydān's non-intervention to be recognised.

Samuel Pallache remained in contact with the Moriscos in spite of the failure of this first attempt to persuade Muley Zaydān, but at the same time he took part in Muley Zaydān's efforts, mentioned above, to control Tetouan, which was still in a state of semi-independence. A letter from the Duke of Lerma discussed by the Council of State in May 1610 stated that "in Tetouan there are over forty thousand Moriscos and they are arming themselves...the Marquis of Villarreal sends word that Muley Xeque is still at the Peñón, and

69 Mercedes García-Arenal and Gerard A. Wiegers, *A Man of Three Worlds: Samuel Pallache, a Moroccan Jew in Catholic and Protestant Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins), 2003.

70 Henin, *Memorial*, 107 "Samuel Pallache, criado de los Estados y de Muley Zidán, el cual, en compañía de unos moriscos de los desterrados de España propusieron que con ocho navíos y dos mil escopeteros, buscarían a su costa poder venir al par de Málaga [...] donde podrían hacer muy gran presa de hacienda y cautivos [...] y le darían a Muley Zidán la cuarta parte de lo que ganara, el sólo tenía que hacer venir los navíos y las armas de Holanda."

from this has lost reputation [...] Maurice's man [i.e. the agent of the Netherlands] has made an offer to Muley Zidan to assist him with a naval fleet and England and France are included in this."[71] The same point is made in a letter to the Duke of Lerma which contains an *aviso* sent by the Marquis of Villarreal from Tangier in August 1614, i.e. after the Expulsion, saying that "in Tetouan they are awaiting the arrival within hours of a ship loaded with arms and munition brought by a Jew named Payache with the order to put themselves under the banners of Muley Zidan. Don Luis Fajardo (the admiral) has been told of it to see if he can frustrate their intentions for from Algiers there are 23 small ships and two large ones which do much damage and take their booty to the ports, because most of those who sail on them are Andalusian Moriscos dressed like Spaniards so there is no safety because they speak Castilian so well, if something is not done about it and what the Marquis intends is to publish a law saying that whoever is caught be executed because what they want is to be taken captive so that they can return to Spain."[72] In the last part of this chapter I will return to the question of the Moriscos who sought to be taken captive in order to go back to Spain.

Samuel Pallache also handled diplomatic contacts with England. In 1611, he travelled to England with the Moroccan ambassador and the English agent John Harrison with a letter from Muley Zaydān for James I. From that moment on, Harrison played an important role and was frequently in contact with Morocco, a country to which he travelled eight times between 1610 and 1632, on two of these occasions accompanied by Samuel Pallache. Through Pallache he made close contact with Moroccan Jews (at one point he wrote that he was learning Hebrew in Safi with a certain "rabbi Shimeon") and Moriscos. Harrison clearly had a keen interest in the Jews and in Judaism more generally, and in 1610, during one of his journeys to Morocco, he wrote a treatise of religious

71 AGS, Estado, Leg. 494: "en Tetuán hay más de cuarenta mil moriscos y que se van armando...que el Marqués de Villarreal avisa que Muley Xeque está todavía en el Peñón, que desto a perdido reputación...que a Muley Cidán le ha ofrecido el de Mauricio socorrelle con Armada y entran en esto Inglaterra y Francia."

72 AGS, Estado, Leg. 2644: "de que en Tetuán esperauan por oras un nauío cargado de armas y muniçiones que le trae a cargo un judío que se llama Payache con orden de apellidar en aquellos contornos por Muley Çidan que a Don Luis Faxardo dio auiso desto para si pudiera auerle a las manos y assi se sabrían sus intentos, que de Argel andan 23 nauios pequeños y 2 grandes haziendo mucho daño y presas a su saluo en los puertos porque la más gente dellos son Moriscos andaluzes vestidos a lo Español con que no ay seguridad por ser tan ladinos si no se pone remedio y el que le parece al Marques es que publique una ley que al que se cogiere sea passado a cuchillo por el quedar por cautibos es lo que desean por bolver a España."

polemic against Judaism which he published in Amsterdam in 1612. Harrison also enjoyed very close relations with Moriscos in both Tetouan and Salé. He felt great sympathy for them and even became an agent and spokesman for the group, which he saw as a dispersed minority forced to undergo a diaspora very similar to that of the Jews.[73]

The Moriscos may have aroused in Harrison the same kind of missionary zeal he felt with regard to the Jews, for we know that in Tetouan he devoted himself to explaining to them the superiority of Protestantism over Catholicism, interpreting that their sympathies and religiosity placed them closer to the former faith, even after their general religious uncertainty had been taken into account.[74] Harrison's was a self-interested assessment of the Moriscos, but an interesting one nonetheless, and it sheds some light on the sympathies felt among the Moriscos for the English and Dutch. England and Holland were not only seen as possible allies against Spain, but as professing a reformed version of Christianity with which the Moriscos found it easier to identify. Harrison also tried to convince Charles I to sign a treaty with the Morisco republic of Salé, but the king refused to recognise it as an independent government as Harrison had argued that it was, comparing it with the United Provinces of Holland, seeing it rather as a group of pirates in rebellion against their King.[75]

As a final reference to Morisco attempts to organise an armed raid on the Peninsula, let us turn to what occurred after another English attack that was planned against the area of the Strait of Gibraltar. When war broke out between Spain and England in 1625 and the English were in the process of preparing a raid on Cádiz, John Harrison offered to go to Morocco and recruit an army of Moriscos to work alongside the English. Charles I agreed to this idea and Harrison went to Tetouan, where the proposal was so well-received that the Moriscos even offered to fight at their own expense. Harrison wrote at length about his stay in Morocco and his contacts with Moriscos, recording that he tried to convince Charles I to conquer Ceuta and Gibraltar in order to control the area of the Strait. The *almocadem* of Tetouan offered 10,000 combatants to the English king for an attack on Ceuta or some other nearby town. All he

73 In Harrison's words, "Moriscos, a forelorne people scattered and dispersed like the Jewes to this daie," SIHM, Angleterre, III, 41.

74 "the greater part so distracted between the idolatrous Roman religion wherein they were borne and Mahometisme under which they groane, as they know not what to believe, but a verie great affection and inclination to our nation and religion," SIHM, Angleterre, III, 42.

75 SIHM, Angleterre, III, 43.

asked for in exchange was gunpowder and the means to refurbish a number of obsolete cannons in Tetouan. In a later letter, Harrison claimed that the Moriscos were willing to provide between 40,000 and 50,000 men to fight against Spain. Harrison added a separate sheet to his letter to Charles I of 20 July 1625, on which the Moriscos had signed a statement of support for the English: "With the favour of God, the Moors and the English will take Spain and with their saints and crosses they will [build the fires to] cook their meals and they will destroy Spain. And all will be brothers and God will help those who followed his commandments. And God above all."[76] Once again, it is easy to detect the underlying messianic note in such a message, which sees the Moriscos returned to Spain and united under one faith, that of Islam, and one undertaking, the conquest of the Peninsula, aims backed by messianic predictions that obviously constituted a long-lasting current of belief.[77] Another underlying element here is the sense of proximity to reformed religion, which like Islam was opposed to the use of holy images such as those to be used to make fires for cooking.

All of these plans fell through when the English were defeated in November of that year. However, Harrison wrote a long "Relation" in which he gave a detailed account of his dealings with the Moriscos.[78] Other records confirm Harrison's account and even point to co-ordinated efforts made by the Moriscos of Algiers. The Spanish ambassador in London, Carlos Coloma, wrote to his king on 28 June 1622 to inform him of Dutch preparations to put a fleet of 150 ships to sea which they would use to attack the West Indies, also telling the king about the agreement between the English and the Moriscos, although this did not seem to trouble him greatly: "and of even greater reach is another fantasy they are plotting, according to the same man and as I have understood from other sources, and this one made me laugh, which is to put together another squadron of 40 ships with the Moors of Algiers and to take 60,000 armed Moriscos to the kingdom of Valencia who are said to be ready and waiting across the water in Barbary, in order to wage war on Spain."[79] If this letter is

76 SIHM. Angleterre, II, 573–582: "Con el favor de Dios, los Moros y los Ingleses tomarán a España y con los santos y cruces guisarán las comidas y destruirán a España. Y serán todos hermanos y ayudará Dios a los que sus mandamientos siguieron. Y Dios sobre todo."

77 SIHM, Pays-Bas, IV, 284.

78 SIHM, Angleterre, III, 27 and ff.

79 AGS, Col. Coloma, minutas de cartas, libro 1, fol. 26: "y cuanto mayor es otra imaginación que traen, conforme me dijo el mismo hombre y he entendido de otras partes, no sin risa, que es juntarse otra escuadra de 40 navíos con los Moros de Argel y pasar al reino de Valencia 60.000 moriscos armados que dicen están aguardándoles a la lengua de agua en Berbería, para con esto meter la guerra en España [...]."

anything to go by, the Spaniards had lost all fear of the Moriscos within just two decades of the Expulsion.

The Expulsion of 1610–1614

Although a large number of Valencian Moriscos had taken refuge in Tetouan, most of the Moriscos who went to Morocco were from the territories of the Crown of Castile, where the Expulsion edict was published on 10 January 1610. Some 80,000 Moriscos went to Morocco from Andalusia, Extremadura and Castile, and most of them settled close to Ceuta, Tangier and Tetouan and other points on the Strait. Many tried to take shelter in the Spanish garrison towns or in the territories around them, outside the town walls, and this created countless problems for the governors of these towns: such governors received frequently repeated orders not to allow them in and to expel all those who entered, regardless of their protests that they were good Christians.[80] To a

80 There are abundant references to this issue in documents in ADM, Leg. 2408 and Leg. 2409:
El Rey al Duque, 1 de diciembre 1610, "En quanto a los Moriscos que se buelven de Bervería con color que son christianos ya se os ha avisado lo que se ha de hazer."; ADM, Leg. 2408. Idem. 23 marzo 1611, "habreis entendido los avissos que se tienen de Orán de que de Argel a baxado una hala de Turcos geniçaros y moriscos, y aunque como sabeis he mandado que se junte golpe de infantería y que se embarque y llebe aquellas plaças todabía combiene para qualquier successo estar con prevención...." ADM, Leg. 2408. El Rey al Duque, 29 junio 1612:..."he visto lo que dezis en materia de los moriscos que estavan en Tánger y téngome por muy servido del cuydado que pusisteis en hazerlos encaminar fuera destos Reynos y os apruevo lo de aver acomodado la cantidad de niños de poca edad hijos de los mesmos moriscos en la forma que apuntays. Para que salgan los Moriscos que avisais están en Ceuta, se dará la orden que convenga con brevedad y assí se lo podreis escribir al Marqués de Villarreal y que seré servido de que haga proceder en lo que tocare contra los que passaren Moriscos a estos Reynos. Al gobernador de Tánger, se le escribe en la forma que advertís acerca que no admita ningunos moriscos en aquella plaça..." ADM, Leg. 2408. Rey al Duque 22 septiembre 1612, "Que prendan a los muchos moriscos que vuelven a entrar por las costas de Andalucía." 3.nov. 1612 vuelve a insistir al respecto, "téngome por muy servido del cuidado que poneis en que no entren moriscos por ahí, y os encargo lo continueis." ADM, Leg. 2409. El Rey al Duque, 9 mayo 1613 "A los Governadores de Ceuta, Tánger y Alarache escrivo que no den plática a los moriscos que llegaren a aquellas plaças como lo advertis y tendreys cuidado por vuestra parte en que los que bolvieren serán castigados" "Queda entendido como havían salydo de Çalé tres navíos en corso y será bien que lo advistays a quien tiene a cargo la Armada [...]" ADM, Leg. 2409. El Rey (7 mayo 1614) he mandado a los gobernadores de Ceuta, Tánger y Alarache que no consientan allí moriscos ningunos.

large extent the Moriscos were defenceless in the face of all manner of abuses by those who transported them to Morocco, but also by the local populations when they arrived and by the Moroccan authorities themselves, who immediately set about recruiting the greatest possible number of them for their armies. However, some Moriscos tried to buy weapons in the areas around the Spanish strongholds. The governors of these towns had to work hard to prevent such purchases from occurring and to drive the Moriscos away from the coastal areas beside the Strait.[81]

In general, the Moriscos were not well received in Morocco. They arrived dressed like Spaniards and speaking in Castilian, and there was little confidence in the strength of their Muslim faith. Indeed, many of them publicly announced their adherence to Catholicism and lost their lives as a result, as was confirmed by numerous witnesses. Juan Luis Rojas,[82] author of a chronicle of Barbary during this period, felt pity for the Moriscos, whose arrival he witnessed, seeing how "their belongings are stolen by the authorities and although they were [seen as] Moors in Spain, almost all the young folk are true Christians in Barbary, as is shown by their words and deeds, as they have tried to approach the Christians, even as slaves, as many of them have confirmed with their blood, in constant martyrdom, Tetouan is a witness to how many have been burnt for confessing their faith, how many have been tied to stakes and killed with clubs and pins; the boys of Larache burned a young lad alive, after a thousand taunts and tortures, and his badly burned bones, though sought with devotion, have not been found."[83] In April 1610, Don Alonso de Noronha

81 Carta del Duque de Medina Sidonia al Rey, 7 de febrero de 1610, "De los moriscos venidos del Andaluzía refieren que los más procuravan comprar armas aunque hallaban pocas de venta y en Alcázar el Alcayde les ha ido a la mano y según dizen avisó al Rey su amo cómo en ellos se había de contener, dizen más, que al pie de 600 casas se fueron a vivir a Alarache pues todos no caben en Alcázar y yo por este repecto deseo mucho más venga a Alcázar el dicho Rey el qual ha determinado lo que havía de hazer con dichos moriscos y quitárseles no sólo el brío de armas más la avitación de todo lugar marítimo y frontero de christianos y entrarlos a todos en la tierra a dentro." ADM, Leg. 2408.

82 Juan Luis de Rojas, *Relaciones de algunos sucesos postreros de Berbería: salida de los Moriscos de España, y entrega de Alarache* (Lisbon: Iorge Rodriguez), 1613, f. 60 v.

83 "cuyos equipajes son robados por las propias autoridades y que siendo como eran Moros en España, es casi toda la gente moza, cristiana verdadera en Berbería, como lo muestran sus palabras y obras, intentando venirse a los cristianos, aunque sean esclavos, como han confirmado muchos con su sangre, en constante martirio, testigo es Tetuán, cuántos han quemado vivos por la confesión de la fe, cuántos han acañaverado y muerto con palos y alfileres; los muchachos de Larache mismo quemaron a un moço vivo, después de mil escarnios, cuyos guesos, mal quemados, aunque se an buscado con devoción, no ha sido

wrote as follows from Tangier to the Duke of Medina Sidonia:[84] "In Alcázar there are a great number of Moriscos from Valencia, Hornachos and Aragón, and all of them are Moors. The *alfaqueque* says that he felt great pity for those of Andalusia, for many of them cried out before the Moors that they were Christians." But the idea that they would return was widespread among the Moriscos. As the Duke of Medina Sidonia wrote, "these people have always lived in the hope that they will have the means to return to these kingdoms."[85]

It is these Moriscos, the ones who tried to return, upon whom I would now like to focus my attention. But in order to understand the phenomenon better, it may be a good idea to look first at other sources of information on what was occurring in the years and even months immediately before the Expulsion among the Moriscos in Castile, where a series of situations arose that were very different from those we have seen in previous discussions of clandestine departures. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest a frenetic situation: a maelstrom of mixed marriages, ostentatious displays of religious devotion, proofs of Old Christian status, sudden enthusiasm for religion among countless individuals facing eviction and initial uncertainty among some of the local authorities and noblemen concerning the Moriscos who should be expelled and those who could be made exempt.[86]

posible hallarlos." See also Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relación,* 4/4/1610. Ignacio Bauer Landauer, *Papeles de mi archivo. Relaciones y manuscritos (moriscos)* (Madrid: Editorial ibero-africano-americana), 1923, has edited versions of several "relaciones" or news of Morisco martyrs in Tetouan.

84 ADM, Leg. 2408: "En Alcázar están gran cantidad de moriscos de los de Valencia, Ornachos y Aragón, son todos moros. Los de Andalusía dice el alfaqueque que le hisieron gran lástima porque a voces andavan muchos dellos diciendo delante de los moros que eran cristianos."

85 "La mayor parte de los moriscos que han quedado de los que se expelieron del Andaluçia y el Reyno de Granada y muchos de los de Aragón an venido a parar a Tituán y sus contornos esta gente siempre ha vivido con esperenças de que tendrían medio para poder bolber a estos Reynos pero como ven el desengaño ablan mucho en materia de la haçienda que dexaron acá y he tenido notiçia que particularmente dizen algunos que dexaron en estos reynos en poder de personas dellos partidas de dinero en confiança para que se les embiasen a donde fueren o para otros efetos y que haciendo aora diligençia para que se les embíen se las niegan y que viéndose en este estado ofrezen que haciéndoles su magestad de vuestra parte deste dinero, declararán las personas que lo tienen que daren papeles recandoles por donde conste de la deuda o la verificavan por informaçiones y haviendo hecho diligençias que cantidad sería ésta me aseguran que de partidas conocidas pasan de doze mil ducados y que si tubiesen noticia otros moriscos que se trataba desto [...]" 30 de marzo 1614. El Duque de Medina Sidonia. AGS, Estado, Leg.2664.

86 "Muchas penitencias, procesiones con letanías, cruces, pendones, insignias y hábitos de mortificación, especialmente iban las doncellas vestidas con túnicas blancas, descalças,

Mixed marriages became especially frequent in the years leading up to the Expulsion. This meant, above all, hastily arranged weddings between Old Christians and Morisco women.[87] The situation was remarked on by the Count of Salazar, who wrote to Juan Hurtado de Mendoza: "There has been a great number of marriages between Morisco women and Old Christians, made with the purpose of staying here, and some of these are highly amusing; a lot of them have also now opted to un-marry and the husbands turn priests and the wives become nuns, and in the monasteries they sell them entry passes as if they were selling a basket of pears, which is scandalous."[88]

In January 1610, the Expulsion of the Moriscos of Andalusia was decreed. The Duke of Medina Sidonia's reluctance concerning this measure was made clear in a letter he sent to the Marquis of San Germán in which he points out "the difficulties involved in harassing or forcing those people out…a great deal of violence will have to be used to remove them from their homes, for they are so intermingled with the Old Christians that there is no difference between them and the others."[89] A greater protest had been registered in January of that same year by the archbishop of Seville, Pedro Vaca de Castro, in a letter to the King, which among other issues covered the topic of mixed marriages and the

velados los rostros, tendidos los cabellos, llevando cruces de mucho peso a cuestas muy gran trecho y las menores llevaban otras imágenes, crucifijos y cruces en las manos y otras acompañándolas con luces, y muchas plegarias de todo género de gente a todas horas del día y más ordinario a la media noche, pasando algunas en vela de claro en claro en las iglesias con disciplinas de sangre de los hombres y tantas lágrimas, sollozos y alaridos, diciendo en grito, señor, misericordia, que ningún ánimo pío lo veía que no se enterneciese." Fr. Marcos de Guadalajara y Xavier, *Memorable expulsión y justíssimo destierro de los moriscos de España* (Pamplona: Nicolás de Assyain), 1613, f. 60 v.

87 Francisco Márquez Villanueva, *Moros, moriscos y turcos de Cervantes. Ensayos críticos* (Barcelona: Bellaterra), 2010, 234. "Trámites urgentes, bodas y donaciones en el puerto de Cartagena." Relación de los matrimonios mixtos en el valle del Ricote a partir de 1598. Also in La Mancha: T.J. Dadson, *Los moriscos de Villarrubia de los Ojos (Siglos XV–XVIII): Historia de una minoría asimilada, expulsada y reintegrada* (Madrid-Frankfurt: Iberoamericana-Vervuert), 2007, 369–372.

88 Apud Dadson, *Los moriscos,* 370: "Ha habido gran cantidad de casamientos de moriscas con cristianos viejos para quedarse, y algunos graciosísimos; ahora han dado en descasarse muchos y ellos se meten frailes y ellas monjas, y en los monasterios les venden estas entradas como si les vendieran un cesto de peras, que es cosa escandalosa esto."

89 Letter of 24 December 1609. AGS, Estado, Leg. 2639: "las dificultades de consideración… para apremiar aquella gente ni echarla… que ha de ser menester mucha violencia para sacarla de sus casas, tan mezclada con los cristianos viejos, que dellos a los que lo son, no ay diferençia ninguna."

offspring resulting from them.[90] Initially, it looked as if his objections would be taken into account. In the words of Cabrera de Córdoba, "The expulsion was at first carried out with such rigour in Seville and surrounding areas, where there were very wealthy persons with very honourable posts, as also in Granada, that it became necessary to make a declaration, in which it was commanded that Old Christians married to Morisco women were not to be expelled, and neither would the descendants of Old Christians, although they were of the Morisco race through the women, nor the descendants of Moors from Barbary or Turks who came to convert to our Holy Faith."[91] This use of the term "Morisco race [raza de moriscos]" should be noted. Like other items of information that have come down to us, it reveals something about the reigning confusion over how to define Moriscos among the very proponents of the Expulsion.

In the early months of 1610, Don Francisco de Irarrazabal was in Granada managing the expulsion of Moriscos from the city "where they are so rooted" and he complained about the number of Moriscos whose proof that they were descended from Old Christians depended on the complicity of neighbours and acquaintances, or people who were prepared to declare in their favour in exchange for a sum of money. In a letter to the King he wrote that in Granada "there are some whose parents and grandparents are known and who even today do not speak the languages [sic] as clearly as we do" and who still produce "false proofs." Note the insistence on the importance of parents and grandparents and on the use of the language as a differentiating factor – no reference is made here to religion. Some Moriscos declared that they were the children of churchmen, i.e. members of the clergy who had fathered children on Morisco servants. There were others who, once their proofs had been presented, wanted to inherit goods from other Moriscos or to take the possessions of expelled Moriscos, but what alarmed Irarrazabal above all was: "it is a great pity and shame that they should say at times that Your Majesty is exercising tyranny over this kingdom and that we are occupying their houses in bad faith, for they say that the *Rey Chico* handed over this kingdom to the lordly Kings of

90 An extremely interesting document edited by Antonio Domínguez Ortiz and Bernard Vincent, *Historia de los moriscos. Vida y tragedia de una minoría* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente), 1978, Apéndice VIII.

91 Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relación*, 396: "Lo cual (la expulsión) se comenzó a ejecutar con tanto rigor en Sevilla y su tierra, donde había personas muy ricas y con oficios muy honrados, así allí como en Granada, que ha convenido hacerse declaración sobre ello, mandando que los cristianos viejos casados con moriscas no fuesen espelidos, y asimesmo los descendientes que vienen de cristianos viejos, aunque tengan raza de moriscos por las hembras, ni los que descienden de moros de Berbería o de turcos que vinieren a convertirse a nuestra Santa Fe [...]."

glorious memory without force of arms and that it is theirs, so that their intentions have now become plain." Their intentions, which Irarrazabal understood to include an armed takeover, showed that according to the Moriscos the kingdom was theirs and now suffered from "tyranny," i.e. was governed and was in the hands of a people with no legitimate claim on the land.[92] In the following year, 1611, a group of Old Christian inhabitants of Granada wrote to the King insisting on the number of false proofs that were being presented by the Moriscos, "enemigos de Dios y de Su Magestad [enemies of God and Your Majesty]", many of which were endorsed by members of the nobility who had taken payment to defend them, being as they were "reos de la sangre de los mártires de las Alpujarras [culprits of the blood of the martyrs of the Alpujarra]". The Old Christians asked for these Moriscos and their accomplices to be punished.[93] Memories of the War of the Alpujarras clearly remained fresh half a century on, both among the Moriscos and the Old Christians. In Granada, the noble families descended from the old Naṣrid aristocracy were not expelled.

There were certainly a number of Moriscos who left with hope in their hearts or who at least interpreted the Expulsion in a providentialist manner, as was expressed by another famous document, the letter written by a Morisco in Barbary to a knight of Trujillo: "banishing us from the land was not the King of Spain's doing: it was divine inspiration, for here I have seen forecasts more than a thousand years old which speak of what has happened to us... But the slightest grievance would cause God to act and he would send a King who would subject the whole world."[94] This was a reiteration of the prophetic and messianic expectations common to the whole Morisco diaspora, as I have mentioned throughout this chapter.[95] There were also many Moriscos, such as those of Hornachos, who headed straight for Morocco and even fulfilled the command to leave their young children behind, but then expressed a desire to recover their offspring, the imposed condition for which was that they had to head for Christian lands.[96] The eventual outcome for most of these Moriscos was a long second journey to Morocco via France and Italy.[97]

92 AGS, Estado, Leg. 245, 10.

93 AGS, Estado, Leg. 245.11

94 Janer, *Condición*, 350–351: "no ha sido en mano del Rey de España el avernos desterrado de la tierra: pues ha sido inspiración divina, porque aquí he visto pronósticos de más de mil años que cuentan lo que a nosotros ha sucedido [...] Pero el más mínimo agravio lo tomaría Dios por su cuenta y embiaría un Rey que sojuzgaría a todo el mundo."

95 García-Arenal, "Un réconfort."

96 ADM, Leg. 2408 Carta del Duque de Medina Sidonia al Rey, 7 febrero 1610.

97 AGS, Estado, Leg. 220.

There was also a number of Moriscos that is difficult to estimate who tried to return to Spain, even at the risk of being condemned to slavery if they were discovered. There are interesting traces of such individuals in the records of the Inquisition, before whose tribunals a number of returning Moriscos appeared and were condemned to row in the royal galleys. Such Moriscos had gone back in efforts to seek reconciliation with the Church and prove that they were good Christians despite the time they had spent in Muslim lands. The vicissitudes suffered by these Moriscos, who argued in their own favour that they had placed their lives at risk in order to return to Spain, can be found in the records of tribunals whose district included the sea ports. In Puerto de Santa María, for example, where the naval fleet was anchored, several Andalusian Moriscos appeared in 1617 "with letters branded on their faces reading *King's galley*."[98]

I will turn now to one well-documented case which is especially significant because of the way it relates to an issue I have already mentioned: the difficulty for other Spaniards of defining clearly what a Morisco was. The case to which I refer occurred in May 1612 and revolved around the large number of Moriscos (about 500) who had taken refuge in Tangier, plus another 200 in Ceuta. All of these Moriscos protested that they were "good Christians." The situation led to correspondence between the Duke of Medina Sidonia and the governor Don Alonso de Noronha, with an intervention by the Marquis of Villarreal, who insisted that all Moriscos, without exception, had to leave the Spanish garrison towns, and that it made no difference if they were Christians. Don Alonso clearly had his misgivings about this, and stated that he honestly believed these Moriscos's declarations of their Christian faith.[99] For this reason, he thought that although they were on Spanish soil, it was not fair to send them to work as galley-slaves and he proposed putting them on ships for France and Italy instead.[100] The decision was eventually taken to send them to Italy, except for their young children, who were sent to Seville to be brought up there by the archbishop of the city. In June 1612, Don Alonso de Noronha reported to the Duke that he had put 480 Moriscos on three French ships bound for Rome and had sent 59 Morisco children to Spain, stating that "no he pasado en mi vida peores dos días" [I have not experienced a worse two days in my life]. A later ship sailed in July with another 200 Moriscos, also bound for Rome.[101]

98 AHN, Inquisición. Libro 1241: "que llevan herrada la cara con letras que dicen Rey galera."
99 AGS, Estado, Leg. 244, 56.
100 AGS, Estado, Leg. 244,121.
101 AGS, Estado, Leg. 244, 134.

Something is known of the fate of this group of Moriscos: eight of them were taken off the ship in Jávea, one of them dead and two gravely ill. The Moriscos told the authorities there that they were starving to death on the ships because they had no provisions.[102] We also know that the transport ships arrived in Italy, but did not receive permission even to enter the roads of Civitavecchia. They anchored for some time in Livorno and in the months that followed a number of the Moriscos were denounced and taken before the Inquisition Commissioner of Pisa.[103] In that same year and for the following two years, documents from Naples make reference to the activities of a Jesuit by the name of Rodríguez who tried to rescue Morisco slave women. Other documents from the same archive contain "spontaneous" confessions made by Moriscos in Naples who had come to be reconciled with the Church.[104] As for the Morisco children, five or six stayed in Tangier because they had been requested by families in which it was known that they would be "brought up properly," whereas the 59 sent to Spain were settled in Seville under conditions to be met by those who took charge of them under the supervision of the Archbishop there.[105]

One striking and apparently paradoxical aspect of this decision to send Moriscos recognised as good Christians to Italy or France without allowing them to tread Spanish soil is that at the same time, certain "Moors of Barbary" who went to Spain to be baptized as Christians were welcomed there and feted at great public ceremonies. One such occasion is described by the Granadan chronicler Henríquez de Jorquera, who wrote that some forty Muslims from Barbary were received and baptized with great solemnity by none other than the Archbishop of Granada.[106] Another example: when in 1614 the *alcaides* of Muley ʿAbd Allāh came to Spain to collect the inherited possessions that had belonged to the deceased Muley Xeque, the entire retinue was allowed to disembark, except for a number of Moriscos who were part of it and who were ordered to be captured and removed from the kingdom. These Moriscos were not allowed to enter Spain, even in their role as servants and envoys of the king of Morocco.[107]

102 AGS, Estado, Leg. 244, 121.
103 Archivio per la Congregazione della Dottrina de la Fede (ACDF), Decreta, 1612, f. 30 y ff. 133, 151, 270, 322. I am grateful to Stefania Pastore for these references.
104 ACDF, Decreta, 141–1781, 144–1818, 146–1852.
105 AGS, Estado, Leg. 244, 55.
106 These and other cases in Domínguez and Vincent, *Historia,* 257.
107 ADM, Leg. 2409, Carta del rey al Duque, 25 de septiembre de 1614.

Salé

Let us examine, lastly, the place which came to represent the expelled Moriscos of Morocco better than any other, the town which has been most closely subjected to the attentions of historians: the port of Salé, where the Moriscos maintained a distinct and semi-independent group identity until the late seventeenth century.

I referred above to the English agent John Harrison and his contacts with the Moriscos of Salé, which resulted in attempts to convince the King of England to assist them or even capture and protect the town. Salé was in fact a double port located on the estuary of the river Bou Regreg, with Rabat on the southern shore and Salé on the northern side. By the time Harrison travelled to Morocco, the most notable self-governing Morisco community, together with Tetouan, was constituted by the fortified port of Rabat-Salé, which became increasingly significant after the Expulsion. The first Moriscos to arrive there came from Hornachos, and they formed a very compact group that was intrepid and firm in its Muslim beliefs. At the time of the Expulsion they were transferred from Seville to Ceuta, where they disembarked and later left for Tetouan. The sultan of Morocco wanted to take advantage of them in making up his armies, and had a particular interest in using them in the hazardous region of the southern border of Morocco beside the Draa. However, the group of around 3000 Moriscos deserted. They were unwilling to be turned into human raw material to be used at the sultan's convenience, and soon demonstrated their very considerable capacity for action and cohesion. The *hornacheros* found the kasbah of Rabat (today called the Kasbah of the Udayas) in ruins, and proceeded to occupy it after a process of rebuilding and fortification, as in Tetouan, where, as we have seen, exiled Granadans and Valencians had moved in throughout the sixteenth century. By 1614, the town was also occupied by a fairly numerous group of about 15,000 Moriscos from Andalusia and Extremadura. It did not take long for conflict between the *hornacheros* and the Andalusians to flare up (the former monopolized all positions of power in the town), but both groups saw themselves as superior to the surrounding populations and clung to a clear desire to steer clear of them, in addition to holding onto their independence from the sultan.

The Expulsion of the Moriscos coincided, as I have said, with Spanish occupation of the Moroccan port of Larache. The Moroccan Atlantic coast offered a formidable base for operations against the Spanish and Portuguese ships en route to the East or West Indies, or on their way back to the Peninsula with their wealthy cargoes of precious metals, spices or sugar. The concession of Larache to Spain in 1610 and the capture of Mamora by the Spaniards in 1614

made the nucleus of Rabat-Salé more important, as it was the only Moroccan port on the North Atlantic coast and was ideally placed to attack the route to the Indies and the Strait of Gibraltar, though the inhabitants of Salé went as far as Galicia, the English Channel and even, on one occasion, Iceland. Rabat-Salé became, like Tetouan, an important corsair nucleus offering shelter to English and Dutch pirates as well as the expelled Moriscos. The English authorities were well aware of the increase in pirate activity caused by the Moriscos, but were more than reluctant to intervene because the main victim of the situation was the King of Spain. Salé had become a thorn in the foot of the Hispanic Monarchy.[108]

After the 1620s Salé figured as an autonomous political structure. The so-called "republic of Salé" was governed by a council of twelve members, called "duán" o *dīwān*, which functioned like a Spanish municipal council, with a chairman who was given the title of Great Admiral. Its organization resembled that of a Spanish town council, but the functions and way of life of the town were more reminiscent of the Turkish ports of the regencies of Algiers, Tunis or Tripoli. In the 1630s, the inhabitants of Salé again declared themselves, at least nominally, vassals of the sultan of Morocco, at the hands of whose army they had suffered attacks, as well as being attacked by other rebel groups in northern Morocco that were opposed to the sultan. The Moriscos of Salé also tried on several occasions to negotiate with Spain, requesting aid and assistance against its enemies and against the pressure exerted by the sultan, who wanted to occupy the town and banish them to a place inland i.e. to remove them from the coast, just as the Spanish authorities had wanted to do with the Granadan Moriscos. The request for assistance in exchange for vassal status was later adapted and turned into offers of total concession of the town for the right to return to Spain. The Moriscos felt threatened by the different political forces in Morocco and yet deeply uninterested in its disputes and rivalries, and the attempt in which Harrison had intervened to hand over the fortified stronghold to the English in exchange for their aid and protection had failed.[109] The first attempt to negotiate with Spain took place in late 1614, and it was repeated

108 John Digby's 1619 report to the British Crown reads as follows: "It is certeyn that there is no nation so much anoyed and infested with the pirats as the dominions of the King of Spaine, very many of them being of the Moriscos which were expelled thence, and every yeare are guides to the Turkes and Mores to do mischeifes upon the coast towns of Spaine; so that it may be considerable wether we should make so much haste to pull this thorne out of the King of Spaines foote or not." SIHM, Angleterre, II, 512.

109 Bouzineb, *La Alcazaba*, 58.

in 1619, 1631, 1637 and 1663.[110] These reiterated efforts to negotiate never led to anything, but have left a considerable trace in the form of abundant and fascinating archive material, recently collected and edited by Hossain Bouzineb.

In the treaty proposal of 1631[111] which the *hornacheros* transmitted via the Duke of Medina Sidonia, they started by defining themselves in the following terms: "the Moriscos who reside in the said kasbah are those who left from Hornajos (Hornachos) and Endelusía (Andalusia) and are more Christian than Moorish." They said that they were in "much confusion and great difficulty" on account of the wars and persecutions visited upon them by the king of Morocco, "together with the great hatred felt towards them by the Arabic Moors, who call them Christians."[112] One is struck again by the strange lack of definition, so typical of Morisco identity, which led them to claim they were more Christian than Moorish. How much more? Indeed, what is it they referred to? What was it about them that was Christian, and what was Moorish? The answer probably depends on whether those assessing them were Old Christians or (Old?) Moors. Whatever the situation may have been, the Moriscos seem to have occupied a liminal position or at least to have been part of a picture in which they were only at ease when they were among themselves, without witnesses or authorities to cast a censuring gaze upon them, a gaze that simply did not understand their mixed and possibly unique identity. By virtue of that identity, they proposed "out of the great love they had for Spain, for ever since they left it they pine for it" the following conditions for handing the town over to Philip IV: firstly, that they be allowed to return to Hornachos, with no responsibility for compensating the inhabitants who had replaced them; secondly, that the municipal authorities be of their own nation, i.e. Moriscos; and finally, that there be no Old Christians in the town other than the priests and friars needed to teach them church doctrine. This is an interesting point which again shows the kind of continuity with their original home communities which still existed. In a *memorial* sent to the King at the end of the previous century, its author Francisco López spoke of Hornachos in the following terms: "all the inhabitants of the town are Moriscos and as such they always seek to make

110 There is an extensive bibliography on the Morisco corsairs of Salé. I would like to point out two of the latest contributions to it: Leila Maziane, *Salé et ses corsaires, 1666–1727: un port de course marocain au XVIIe siècle* (Caen: Presses Universitaires), 2007. Bouzineb, *La Alcazaba*, which contains an important collection of edited documents.

111 First published and edited by G.S. Colin, "Projet de traité entre les morisques de la Casba de Rabat et le roi d' Espagne en 1631," *Hespéris* 52 (1955), 17–26: "los moriscos que residen en la dicha alcasaba son los que salieron de Hornajos y Endalusía y tienen más de christianos que de moros."

112 Bouzineb, *La Alcazaba*, 58.

much trouble with the Old Christians living in the town and insult them so that they will not come here."[113] This seems to show the clear desire for autonomy and self-governed isolation which were to be reproduced in the Moroccan ports.

Other treaty conditions included the one that the Inquisition not be permitted to punish Moriscos born in Barbary who knew nothing of the Christian religion (this despite the fact that were "more Christian than Moorish"), for a period of at least twenty years. Their estates were to be respected and they would not be discriminated against in their tributary obligations, and the same guarantees would be made to the Andalusians who wanted to come back with them "for there are many in Tetouan and Algiers who if they knew they could come safely, would come." As proof that they were good Christians they would send information endorsed by Christian captives about how many Moriscos had been martyred for the faith of Christ. They offered to go to Seville with their corsair ships, which would become the property of His Majesty the King. They also demanded to be given back the children who had been taken from them at the time of the Expulsion. In exchange, they offered to hand over all the might of Salé with its 68 cannons. They would also give up the correspondence they had had with the King of England and the papers they had from the States General of the Netherlands. In England "their ambassadors had been López de Zajar, a clerk who was from Hornachos, and Mahamet de Clavijo, a Morisco from Úbeda." They also said that "before leaving they will strip the Jewish quarter of its great wealth, waiting for the time in which the Jews of Flanders come with very rich ships, and all of this will be handed over to His Majesty; and the other estates of the Dutch and French merchants, which are usually considerable." This document is signed by Mahamet ben Abdelkader, governor of the Kasbah, the *caid* Bexer Brahin de Vargas and the clerks Mahamet Blanco and Musa Santiago. The signatures reflect Castilian usage in both the Arabic personal and family name, proving once again the idea of a mixed and peculiar identity with its "Christian" and "Moorish" ingredients.

In the correspondence provoked by this treaty, and the follow-up to it, the Moriscos added some interesting information.[114] For example, they asked for maximum discretion, saying that if information about the negotiations were to leak out, the Moriscos of Tunis and other parts of Barbary would be placed at

113 Bouzineb, *La Alcazaba*, 33: "todos los vecinos de la villa son moriscos y como tales, pretenden hacer muchas molestias y vexaciones a los cristianos viejos que viven en esta villa afin de que no vengan a vivir a ella."

114 Documents published by Bouzineb, *La Alcazaba*, see especially docs. 26 and 27.

great risk.[115] Contacts and networks involving groups of exiled Moriscos abroad existed, in other words, and remained alive some fifty years after the Expulsion. But this treaty project did not reveal a homesick longing for Spain so much as a continued desire among some of the Morisco communities to live in a more cohesive and compact manner. Their wish was to live autonomously, and among themselves. They wanted to be free from the interference of Christian authorities, but also free from the interference of Muslim authorities, in a clear attempt to create their own identity as a different and separate community.

By Way of Conclusion

This chapter has shown the existence of a series of patterns and continuities in Morisco emigration to Morocco. The Moriscos clung to their desire to reconquer the south of Spain and while they waited for this to occur, they set about creating their own independent kingdom on certain parts of the Moroccan coast. The term "kingdom" may be a little exaggerated, but it can at least be agreed that the Moriscos defended a different communal identity and wished to create a space for it. Perhaps what can be seen here is a desire to continue living in accordance with the old medieval pacts brought to an end by the Catholic Monarchs and the Expulsion decrees. These pacts had allowed the different communities to live as such, with their own civil and religious authorities, or as the non-Muslim communities had lived in the Ottoman Empire in the regime known as *millet*. In the Western Mediterranean, these sorts of pacts or negotiations with the central powers were no longer admissible. Although I have insisted on the continuity that persisted throughout the period under discussion, which lasted nearly two hundred years, it is also quite simple to see the changes that took place in the Morisco populations of the Peninsula, which became especially obvious once those populations settled on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar. Thus the Moriscos expelled in the early seventeenth century displayed a wide and mixed range of religious, linguistic and cultural characteristics which show that, contrary to official propaganda and efforts to legitimize the Expulsion, a considerable proportion of the Moriscos had gone a long way towards assimilating and becoming virtually indistinguishable from their Castilian and Christian counterparts. At the same time they were very different from the indigenous Moroccan populations, and much more distant from them than had been the case during the first waves of Granadan emigration.

115 Bouzineb, *La Alcazaba*, doc. 28.